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I. INTRODUCTION 
The scientific community agrees that release of over 565 
gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalents into the atmosphere 
through 2050 would cause global warming in excess of the 
maximum tolerable level.1  The Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) is even 
more pessimistic with regard to the maximum tolerable level.2  
We have already burned through 570 gigatons of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (“CO2e”)—out of one teraton available—
leaving only 430 gigatons of burnable carbon remaining.3  Ever. 
Currently, attempts to reduce the greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions rate—both domestically and globally—have focused 
on gradual reductions to achieve a sustainable rate by 2050.  
To date, these efforts have proven completely unsuccessful:  
carbon emissions global rates continue to increase.4  Although 
the IPCC has concluded that global greenhouse gas emissions 
must be cut between fifty and eighty percent by 2050,5 neither 
the now-lapsed Kyoto Protocol nor the most recent voluntary 
national commitments have come close.6  There is no realistic 
prospect that sustainable global controls on greenhouse gas 
emissions will be adopted in the next decade.  Instead, the 
global community is on track to surpass the one teraton 
available in the next fifteen to twenty years.7  At that point, the 
only way to avoid climate catastrophe will be the cessation of 
emissions:  the global abolition of fossil fuels.  Abolition will be 
necessary, even though proven fossil fuel reserves of 
approximately two teratons of CO2e will still be in the ground.8 
 
1.  See discussion infra Part II.  
2.  See id.; see also IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND 
VULNERABILITY, TOP LEVEL FINDINGS FROM THE WORKING GROUP II AR5 SUMMARY FOR 
POLICY MAKERS, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/docs/WGIIAR5_SPM_Top_Level_ 
Findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8XL-5ZGB] [hereinafter IPCC TOP LEVEL FINDINGS].  
3.  See discussion infra Part II. 
4.  See Alex Pashley, C02 Levels Make Largest Recorded Annual Leap, NOAA Data 
Shows, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2016, 11:34 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/ 2016/mar/10/co2-levels-make-largest-recorded-annual-leap-noaa-data-
shows [https://perma.cc/N8QG-LQMZ]. 
5.  See IPCC TOP LEVEL FINDINGS, supra note 2.  
6.  See Max Paris, Kyoto Climate Change Treaty Sputters to a Sorry End, CBC NEWS 
(Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/kyoto-climate-change-treaty-sputters-
to-a-sorry-end-1.1184986 [https://perma.cc/QUX8-UFXR]. 
7.  See discussion infra Part II. 
8.  See id.  
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Climate change’s scientific logic mandates that abolition will 
be necessary.  Although the climate activism movement has 
only recently explicitly adopted this goal, the inexorable math 
of the climate problem has made this result apparent for years.  
Political commentators have observed that abolition is the 
logical endpoint of the climate conundrum and have begun to 
speculate about the economic dislocations involved under the 
mantle of “The New Abolitionism.”  In 2008, Al Gore—one of 
the most prominent political advocates with regard to climate 
change—argued that fossil fuel use needed to be terminated 
within a decade.9  The Group of Seven (“G7”) has called to end 
fossil fuel use by 2100.10  Even the Saudi Arabian Minister of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources has been quoted as 
envisioning an end to fossil fuels by mid-century.11 
This Article will examine the practical, ethical, legal, and 
socio-political implications of fossil fuel abolition.  First, the 
Article will consider the practical, ethical, and legal arguments 
in favor of fossil fuel abolition.  Then, the Article will examine 
possible legal means and authorities to implement abolition in 
the United States, as well as potential legal objections to fossil 
fuel abolition.  Finally, the Article will consider legal abolition’s 
capacity to effect the far-reaching changes in our socio-
economic system that a ban on fossil fuels will entail.  The 
Article also will compare the climate reform movement to other 
social law reform movements in the past, including the civil 
rights movement, the temperance movement, and the slavery 
abolition movement.  The Article concludes that there are 
strong practical, ethical, and legal arguments for fossil fuel 
abolition.  However, the climate activism movement must 
mature before it is likely to achieve the necessary social 
consensus to implement abolition. 
 
9.  Elana Schor, Gore Calls for End of Using Fossil Fuels for Electricity in US by 
2018, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2008, 2:34 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2008/jul/17/algore.energyefficiency [https://perma.cc/NX58-KL2F]. 
10.  Kate Connolly, G7 Leaders Agree to Phase Out Fossil Fuel Use by End of 
Century, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/08/g7-
leaders-agree-phase-out-fossil-fuel-use-end-of-century [https://perma.cc/2P49-XNQA]. 
11.  Michael Rose, Saudi Oil Minister Sees Eventual End of Fossil Fuels, REUTERS 
(May 21, 2015, 11:10 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/21/us-saudi-oil-
climate-idUSKBN0O61Y520150521?mod=related&channelName=ousivMolt 
[https://perma.cc/FM86-TVJV]. 
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II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
Even among the environmental community, the monumental 
social and economic changes necessary to avoid catastrophic 
climate changes are not fully understood.  Simply convincing 
everyone to switch their light bulbs to compact fluorescent 
lighting and to trade in their conventional automobiles for 
hybrids will not be sufficient.  Social commentators, in addition 
to recent economic and technical studies, have established that 
it is possible to convert to a zero-carbon renewable energy 
economy.12  However, the studies assume some fairly radical 
changes in individual conduct.  Americans would have to trade 
their current housing stock in far-flung suburbs for ultra-
efficient housing in urban transit-friendly settings and 
abandon their single-passenger automobile commutes for 
public transportation in order to realize these zero-carbon 
future visions.13  This conversion would have economic costs, 
but most economists now agree that these costs would be more 
than offset by future climate change response costs avoided.14  
Even if economically offset, this adjustment to a new energy 
economy will involve a dramatic social adjustment as existing 
communities are reorganized in more energy efficient patterns. 
The relentless mathematics of the climate change problem 
lay bare the extreme changes necessary to accommodate a 
climate-sustainable energy economy.  Climate activist Bill 
McKibben points out in his “Do the Math” speaking tour and 
movie that the world can only afford to burn another 565 
gigatons of CO2e by mid-century to avoid catastrophic climate 
change.15  Oil and coal companies’ reserves exceed this 
 
12.  See Mark Z. Jacobson et al., 100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water, and 
Sunlight (WWS) All Sector Energy Roadmaps for the 50 United States, 8 ENERGY 
ENVTL. SCI. 2093 (2015), https://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/ 
I/USStatesWWS.pdf [https://perma.cc/95AD-WYUY] (showing through a Stanford 
University study that each State can achieve 100% renewable energy by 2050); see 
generally GEORGE MONBIOT, HEAT:  HOW TO STOP THE PLANET FROM BURNING (2009). 
13.  See, e.g., MONBIOT, supra note 12, at xix. 
14.  See, e.g., Dana Nuccitelli, Climate Dollars and Sense—Preventing Global 
Warming Is the Cheap Option, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2014, 10:16 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2014/apr/22/ 
preventing-global-warming-cheaper-than-adapting [https://perma.cc/Y4WX-PTDN]. 
15.  See Do the Math, 350.ORG, http://math.350.org/ [https://perma.cc/RJM9-G8U2] 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2016); see also Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New 
Math, ROLLING STONE (July 19, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/ 
global-warmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719 [https://perma.cc/S5WU-6LFR]. 
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threshold five-fold, and the globe is on track to cross the mid-
century threshold in just fifteen years.16 
Taking Bill McKibben’s math one simple step further reveals 
the ultimate futility of attempting to allocate the remaining 
CO2 increment:  565 gigatons of CO2 that the planet can burn 
between 2013 and 2050 equals a maximum of about 15 
gigatons per year.  There are some 7 billion people on Earth.17  
Simple division reveals an equally distributed per capita limit:  
15 billion tons per year divided by 7 billion people equals 
roughly 2 tons per person per year, even assuming zero 
population growth. 
This inexorable math reveals a fundamental challenge to 
treating carbon emissions as a mere allocation problem.  
Carbon pricing becomes inextricable from global anti-poverty 
and distributive justice:  carbon footprints are directly 
proportional to global standard of living, and the (short-term) 
sustainable rate of carbon emissions is inconsistent with 
current middle class standards of living in the developed world.  
Assuming most peoples’ total carbon footprint is about twice 
their direct personal carbon footprint,18 that leaves about one 
ton per person per year globally as a maximum direct carbon 
footprint.  That is about 100 gallons of gasoline (20 pounds of 
CO2 per gallon).19  That is enough to drive the average car 
2,100 miles or a Prius hybrid 5,000 miles.20  Or it is enough for 
 
16.  McKibben, supra note 15. 
17.  Robert Schlesinger, The 2015 U.S. and World Populations, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/robert-
schlesinger/2014/12/31/us-population-2015-320-million-and-world-population-72-billion 
[https://perma.cc/3W9D-9SKX]. 
18.  Although definitions of “direct” versus “indirect” carbon footprints vary, an 
individual’s direct footprint can be seen as those carbon-emitting activities that an 
individual has control over on a short term basis, such as individual transportation and 
home heating and lighting choices, while an individual’s indirect impact includes those 
carbon-emitting activities over which the individual lacks direct control, such as the 
heating and lighting at one’s place of employment, the embedded carbon footprint of 
durable goods used by the individual, and carbon-emitting community activities.  See 
How Big Is Your Carbon Footprint?, 3M WORLDLYWISE, http://www.3m.co.uk/intl/uk/ 
3mworldly-wise/carbon-footprint-homepage.htm [https://perma.cc/L4R7-47PV] (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
19.  See Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator, EPA, 
http://www2.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator [https://perma.cc/ 
VC3C-9VK3] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
20.  See id.; see also Fuel Economy of 2015 Toyota Prius, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, 
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/bymodel/2015_Toyota_Prius.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/SN6Q-QCNB] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
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a one-way flight from New York to Los Angeles (or one round-
trip flight, if one assumes the lowest carbon impacts presented 
by various carbon calculators).  Or, according to one online 
carbon calculator, that one ton of CO2e would represent just 
one-sixth of one individual’s share of the energy consumption of 
a three-bedroom single family house in Atlanta that has 
already implemented every available energy conservation 
measure, including compact fluorescent lighting.21 
Even in the short-term, a per capita allocation of the 
maximum rate of carbon emission is inconsistent with the 
middle class standard of living.  Yet an economic allocation of 
carbon emissions based on purchasing power—achieved by a 
global price on carbon—would maintain existing global 
inequalities of consumption and living standards.  An 
allocation approach to climate change runs afoul of global anti-
poverty and development goals as well as notions of 
distributive and historical justice.  It is no accident that global 
climate negotiations were frustrated by economic development 
and distributive justice:  the emerging economies demand an 
allowance for fossil fuel-powered development commensurate 
with the developed post-industrial economies; the poorer 
nations of the world seek to link climate goals with global 
development and anti-poverty concessions.22 
This Article posits that attempts to limit carbon emissions to 
the 565 gigaton increment will be unsuccessful, and that the 
increment will be exhausted in the next two decades or so.  
Once the increment is used, fossil fuel abolition will be the only 
remaining practical response to global warming.  In any event, 
an equal per capita allocation of the permissible increment—
two tons per person—would essentially mean fossil fuel 
abolition in the United States, as this limit represents a ninety 
percent reduction in U.S. per capita emissions. 
 
21.  See Carbon Footprint Calculator, NATURE CONSERVANCY, 
http://www.nature.org/ greenliving/carboncalculator/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9ZKB-
7AXF] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
22.  See Magdalena Mis, 800 Million Still Hungry and Poor Despite Progress of 
Millennium Goals:  U.N., REUTERS (July 6, 2015, 1:23 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2015/07/06/us-development-goals-un-
idUSKCN0PG1ZI20150706 [https://perma.cc/FQ7L-LLWL]. 
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III. THE CASE FOR FOSSIL FUEL ABOLITION 
The case for fossil fuel abolition will rest on ethical, practical, 
and pragmatic considerations.  First, no system of laws—
domestic or international—will ban a practice without reaching 
the conclusion that the underlying practice is unethical.23  The 
ethical basis of the ban might be utilitarian or deontologically 
based, but before a practice can be banned, it must be 
considered wrongful.24  The ban’s ethics may be based on 
simple avoidance of harm to others, utilitarian concepts of 
avoiding imminent societal harm, or more inchoate ethics of 
avoiding human destruction of natural systems.25  A ban is also 
likely to become a practical matter of scientific necessity as the 
international economic system rapidly burns through the 
remaining allowable increment of greenhouse gas emissions.  A 
fossil fuel ban may ultimately be the most pragmatic 
international response to climate change, as the simplicity of a 
ban avoids the unsolvable distributive justice problems of any 
system of allocating greenhouse gas emissions limits. 
A. The Ethical Case:  Avoiding Harm 
Several writers have made the ethical case for limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions,26 and this Article will not attempt to 
re-argue that case.  In essence, the primary argument for 
limiting—and ultimately ceasing—greenhouse gas emissions 
proceeds from the basic ethical principle of avoiding harm to 
others.27  Burning fossil fuels results in greenhouse gas 
emissions that will change the global climate in ways that will 
interfere with food production and cause sea level rise.28  These 
changes will cause grievous harms to people globally, from food 
 
23.  STEVEN BARKAN, LAW AND SOCIETY:  AN INTRODUCTION 150 (2009). 
24.  See id. 
25.  See id. 
26.  See, e.g., Paul Baer, Equity, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Global Common 
Resources, in CLIMATE CHANGE:  A SURVEY 394 (Stephen Schneider et al. eds., 2002); 
John C. Dernbach & Donald A. Brown, The Ethical Responsibility to Reduce Energy 
Consumption, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 985 (2009); Richard C.J. Somerville, The Ethics of 
Climate Change, YALE ENV’T 360 (June 3, 2008), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/ 
the_ethics_of_climate_change/1365/ [https://perma.cc/86QD-UE9N]. 
27.  See Dernbach & Brown, supra note 26. 
28.  Climate Impacts on Global Issues, EPA, 
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts/ 
international.html [https://perma.cc/B8JF-2Z9U] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
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shortages, flooding, and civil strife as climate refugees move to 
higher ground.29  Even if the global temperature increase is 
limited to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, 
grievous environmental and human harms are likely to result:  
the complete inundation and destruction of low-lying island 
nations, and a high-risk of casualties affecting millions of 
people from extreme weather events including hurricanes, 
floods, and heat waves in sensitive areas.30  As the global 
temperature increases, the risk of disruptions to unique 
ecosystems, extreme weather events, inequitable distribution of 
impacts burdening the poor, global aggregate impacts, and 
large scale events all become “high” or “very high.”31  As these 
thresholds are exceeded, the partial loss of Arctic summer ice 
and the complete loss of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet become 
likely, causing even more extreme sea level rise, coastal 
inundation, and climate refugees.32  Additionally, the risk of 
reaching a global “tipping point” where thermal feedbacks 
cause a climate shift to a much hotter global climate 
unrecognizable to human beings is amplified.33  These grievous 
harms make it unethical to cause greenhouse gas emissions in 
excess of a nation’s or an individual’s fair share, and these 
harms will make it unethical to emit any greenhouse gases 
once the global increment is depleted. 
Although some utilitarian ethical systems allow for harm to 
others to serve a greater good, no system of ethics allows 
 
29.  See id. 
30.  See Petra Tschakert, Commentary, 1.5°C or 2°C:  A Conduit’s View from the 
Science-Policy Interface at COP20 in Lima, Peru, Climate Change Responses, 2015 2:3, 
at 1, http://climatechangeresponses.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40665-015-
0010-z [https://perma.cc/EU5Q-VKML]. 
31.  Id. at 9 fig.3; IPCC TOP LEVEL FINDINGS, supra note 2. 
32.  See Global Warming Puts the Arctic on Thin Ice, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, 
http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/qthinice.asp [https://perma.cc/5KBN-SXHZ] (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2016); see also Carolyn Gramling, Just a Nudge Could Collapse West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet, Raise Sea Levels 3 Meters, SCI. MAG. (Nov. 2, 2015, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/11/just-nudge-could-collapse-west-antarctic-ice-
sheet-raise-sea-levels-3-meters [https://perma.cc/R2CN-XVKC].   
33.  JOHN C. AYERS, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 13 (2011), http://www.vanderbilt.edu/ 
Sustainability/book/S1C6.pdf [https://perma.cc/92BU-7GSF]; Brian Kahn, Scientists 
Predict Huge Sea Level Rise Even If We Limit Climate Change, GUARDIAN (July 10, 
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/10/scientists-predict-huge-
sea-level-rise-even-if-we-limit-climate-change [https://perma.cc/R2TT-SNX5]; see also 
Anders Levermann & Johannes Feldmann, Collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet 
After Local Destabilization of the Amundsen Basin, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14191 
(2015). 
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grievous harms to others to provide luxuries to some.  This has 
led commentators to conclude that greenhouse gas emissions, 
other than for basic sustenance and shelter, are unethical—at 
least as long as no allocation system exists to prevent the 
harms from occurring.34  A white paper prepared by the Rock 
Institute has concluded that no system of ethics would justify 
continued emissions of greenhouse gases by developed nations 
in excess of an equal per capita allocation of the remaining 
GHG increment.35  Principles of distributive justice require 
priority be given to the least well-off, and principles of 
compensatory justice require that those who have benefited 
most from past greenhouse gas emissions have the weakest 
claim to an allocation exceeding equal distribution.36 
Some have argued that no ethical responsibility is owed to 
persons not yet in existence.37  However, as Professor Simon 
Caney points out, this argument fails on two grounds.38  First, 
climate change is harming and will harm people who already 
exist—today’s children will suffer the future impacts of climate 
change.39  Second, there is no ethically-valid reason to ignore 
harms to future persons.40  Future persons will have the same 
fundamental right to the basic human needs for food and 
shelter as people now in existence.41 
Another possible objection to an ethical duty to avoid 
greenhouse gas emissions is the collective nature of the harm:  
no single individual’s or nation’s greenhouse gas emissions can 
be independently responsible for the global climate harms.42  
However, there should be an ethical duty to avoid aggregate 
harms once it is clearly apparent that they are occurring.43  
 
34.  See Dernbach & Brown, supra note 26; Simon Caney, Justice and the 
Distribution of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 5 J. GLOBAL ETHICS 125 (2009). 
35.  See generally DAVID BROWN ET AL., ROCK ETHICS INSTITUTE, WHITE PAPER ON 
THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2006), http://rockethics.psu.edu/ 
documents/whitepapers/edccwhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DUP-8NG5]. 
36.  See id. 
37.  See Simon Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice, Rights and Global Climate Change, 19 
CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 255 (2006). 
38.  See id. 
39.  Id. at 272–73. 
40.  See id. at 263. 
41.  See id. 
42.  See Joakim Sandberg, “My Emissions Make No Difference”:  Climate Change 
and the Argument from Inconsequentialism, 33 ENVTL. ETHICS 229 (2011). 
43.  WOUTER PEETERS ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 
(2015). 
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This principle is similar to the imposition of joint and several 
liability for joint tortfeasors, where harm is not divisible.44 
The aggregate nature of global climate harm might also 
argue in favor of a regulatory approach, rather than a ban.  
The ethical arguments to date have focused on emitting 
greenhouse gases in excess of an individual’s or a nation’s fair 
share, begging the question of what a fair share is.  However, 
this argument loses force once the permissible increment of 
cumulative GHG emissions has been reached—at that point 
everyone’s fair share of allowable emissions will be zero.  There 
may have a been a time when the global climate system could 
be allocated like the sheep meadow in Garrett Hardin’s tragedy 
of the commons, but that time has almost passed.45 
The collective nature of the climate harm may bear on the 
ethical case for a ban on fossil fuels in another way—by 
interrupting the but-for causal link between individual conduct 
and harm.  As there is no direct causal link between any 
individual’s use of fossil fuels and harm to any other person—
present or future—the ethical case for banning fossil fuel use 
may not be as strong as for prohibiting homicide or assault, for 
example.  However, this causation argument has been 
refuted.46 
 
44.  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009); United 
States v. BestFoods Corp., 524 U.S. 51 (1998); United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. 
Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 
1983); Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1952). 
45.  Katha Pollitt, Climate Change is the Tragedy of the Global Commons, NATION 
(Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/climate-change-tragedy-global-
commons/ [https://perma.cc/T3SM-RALE]. 
46.  Ben Almassi has written a persuasive analysis of the individual moral 
responsibility for climate change’s collective harms.  Ben Almassi, Climate Change and 
the Ethics of Individual Emissions:  A Response to Sinnott-Armstrong, 4 PERSP. INT’L 
POSTGRADUATE J. PHIL. 15 (2012).  Almassi responded to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s 
suggestion that, due to the lack of but-for causation for climate change, there is nothing 
morally wrong with driving a gas guzzling SUV “just for fun.”  See id.; see also Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong, It’s Not My Fault:  Global Warming and Individual Moral 
Obligations, in PERSPECTIVES ON CLIMATE CHANGE 221–53 (W. Sinnott-Armstrong & 
R. Howarth eds., 2005).  Almassi draws on the threshold nature of climate change 
causality, reasoning that since all individual emissions increase the likelihood that 
climate change thresholds will be surpassed, and since no individual can be sure that 
their own emissions will not cause the threshold to be passed, individual “luxury” 
emissions are morally wrong even without certainty of a but-for causal relationship to 
a climate change harm to any individual.  See Almassi, supra, at 15.  He also notes the 
“contagious” nature of luxury emissions, which encourages other people to engage in 
such conduct and expands the effective emissions beyond those of the individual actor.  
See id. at 16. 
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The collective nature of the harm should not stand in the way 
of a ban.  Environmental laws have banned other forms of 
collective harms, such as the use of lead additives in motor 
vehicle fuels47 or the individual taking of an endangered 
species.48  These bans recognize the necessity of banning 
individual conduct that increases the likelihood of a negative 
environmental result, despite the lack of direct but-for 
causation. 
It bears noting that the utilitarian concern for harms to 
persons—present and future—is not the only possible ethical 
basis to limit or ban climate altering greenhouse gas emissions.  
Utilitarian concerns solely based on the adverse effects of 
climate change on human beings constitute a form of 
anthropocentric ethics—one that only recognizes intrinsic 
value in human beings, but not in environmental integrity 
itself.49  The environmental ethics awakening of the mid-
twentieth century recognized that non-human animals and 
natural systems also have intrinsic value worthy of recognition 
in any system of utilitarian ethics.  The so-called “deep ecology 
movement” recognized that all living things have their own 
intrinsic value.50  Environmental ethics that respect natural 
systems and hold that humans have no ethical right to destroy 
them, would hold that humans must avoid activities that 
destroy nature—including the natural climate system.  This is 
the basis of Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic”:  the idea that 
something is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, 
stability, and beauty of the biotic community, and wrong when 
it tends otherwise.51 
This environmental ethic underlies such legislation as the 
Endangered Species Act and the Wilderness Act.52  It has its 
 
47.  See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
48.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
49.  Andrew Brennan & Yeuk-Sze Lo, Environmental Ethics, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS (E. N. Zalta ed., 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/ethics-environmental/ [https://perma.cc/7QDN-28E9].  
50.  Arne Naess, The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement, 16 
INQUIRY 95 (1973), reprinted in THE DEEP ECOLOGY MOVEMENT:  AN INTRODUCTORY 
ANTHOLOGY 3–9 (Alan Dregson & Yuichi Inoue eds., 1995). 
51.  ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 262 (1949). 
52.  See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533–44 (2012); Wilderness 
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–36 (2012); see also Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered 
Species:  The Importance of Being Wild, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1999). 
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roots in the basic human moral instincts of purity53 and the 
corresponding natural human appreciation for nature.54  This 
basic principle of environmentalism supplements the 
anthropocentric utilitarian harm-avoidance arguments for 
banning fossil fuels. 
This environmental ethic is itself a form of utilitarianism, 
one that recognizes non-human ecological values as goal 
worthy.  Non-utilitarian approaches to ethics exist as well.  
Deontological ethics is a form of rule-based or authority-based 
ethics; actions are judged by their consistency or inconsistency 
with an ethical maxim.55  The Ten Commandments are a form 
of deontological ethics.56  Aldo Leopold’s land ethic might also 
be considered a form of deontological ethics.57  Application of 
deontological ethics to the issue of climate change may be 
problematic, as deontological ethics are indeterminate—there 
is no objective way to determine whose “authoritative” ethical 
maxims are the correct ones.  Indeed, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has cast some doubt on reliance on deontological 
(non-utilitarian) ethics as a source of liberty-reducing 
prohibitions in criminal law.  In Lawrence v. Texas—striking 
down laws criminalizing same-sex sodomy—Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion stated: 
 
This case raises a different issue than Bowers:  whether, under 
the Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate 
state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual 
sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy.  It is not.  Moral 
disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is 
an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review 
under the Equal Protection Clause. . . .  Indeed, we have never 
held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state 
interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection 
 
53.  See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND:  WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED 
BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 15 (2012). 
54.  Nicholas A. Robinson, Evolved Norms:  A Canon for the Anthropocene, in RULE 
OF LAW FOR NATURE 46–71 (Christina Voigt ed., 2014). 
55.  See J.P. Moreland, Ethics Theories:  Utilitarianism vs. Deontological Ethics, 
CHRISTIAN RES. INST. (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.equip.org/article/ethics-theories-
utilitarianism-vs-deontological-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/HS3Q-92Q7]. 
56.  See WILFRED BECKERMAN, ECONOMICS AS APPLIED ETHICS:  VALUE 
JUDGEMENTS IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 80 (2011). 
57.  J. BAIRD CALLICOTT, IN DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIC:  ESSAYS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (1989). 
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Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of 
persons.58 
 
Lawrence, in essence, rejected a deontological ethical 
maxim—the asserted Biblical prohibition against homosexual 
conduct—as a rational basis for drawing distinctions among 
people.  This passage suggests that laws seeking to enforce 
deontological moral norms, unsupported by utilitarian ethical 
principles, might not survive rational basis scrutiny under 
either the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause or the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.59 
With this caveat that deontological—authoritarian, rule-
based—ethics may be a weak source of legal proscriptions, it 
bears noting that world religious leaders are moving in the 
direction of recognizing a proscription against harming the 
global climate system on theological grounds.  The most 
striking recent development, of course, is Pope Francis’s 
Laudato Si’—an encylical on the environment and climate 
change issued on June 18, 2015.60  Pope Francis wrote that: 
 
The creation accounts in the book of Genesis contain, in their 
own symbolic and narrative language, profound teachings about 
human existence and its historical reality.  They suggest that 
human life is grounded in three fundamental and closely 
intertwined relationships:  with God, with our neighbor and with 
the earth itself.61 
. . . . 
. . . A very solid scientific consensus indicates that we are 
presently witnessing a disturbing warming of the climatic 
system.  In recent decades this warming has been accompanied 
by a constant rise in the sea level and, it would appear, by an 
increase of extreme weather events, even if a scientifically 
determinable cause cannot be assigned to each particular 
phenomenon.  Humanity is called to recognize the need for 
changes of lifestyle, production and consumption, in order to 
 
58.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003). 
59.  Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Susan Austin Blazier, The Irrational 
Use of Rational Basis Review in Lawrence v. Texas:  Implications for Our Society, 26 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 26, 31–32 (2004). 
60.  See POPE FRANCIS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER LAUDATO SI’ OF THE HOLY FATHER 
FRANCIS ON CARE OF OUR COMMON HOME (June 18, 2015), 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papafrancesco_20
150524_ enciclica-laudato-si_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJQ9-R7ZD]. 
61.  Id. at para. 66.  
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combat this warming or at least the human causes which produce 
or aggravate it.62 
 
Pope Francis has thus brought Catholic orthodoxy into the 
creation care movement of Christianity, which similarly holds 
that humans are stewards of God’s creation and have a 
responsibility to preserve the global ecosystem intact.63  This 
recognition of stewardship obligations stands in contrast to the 
so-called “dominion” theory of Judeo-Christian environmental 
thought, which relies on the Biblical injunction to humans to 
“be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue 
it:  and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over fowl of 
the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the 
earth.”64  Following Pope Francis’s lead, a group of Islamic 
religious and environmental leaders issued its own call to 
phase out non-renewable energy and stop greenhouse gas 
emissions no later than 2050.65  There is thus some 
deontological ethical support for a prohibition on burning fossil 
fuels. 
The third major rule of ethical thought—virtue ethics—also 
provides ambiguous support for a prohibition against fossil fuel 
use.  Virtue ethics looks to the motivations and character traits 
of the moral actor rather than to the effects (utilitarian) or 
rule-compliance (deontology) of the acts in question.66  Virtue 
ethics has its roots in the ancient Greek philosophical 
traditions of Socrates and Aristotle, and seeks to promote a 
state of individual harmony through actions consistent with 
personal virtues such as courage, honesty, rationality, 
friendliness, and loyalty.67  As virtue ethics seeks to promote 
individual self-realization and a state of harmony, its 
 
62.  Id. at para. 23. 
63.  See European Parliament Address by Pope Francis, C-SPAN (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?323063-1/pope-francis-address-european-parliament 
[http://perma.cc/24W6-8GU2]. 
64.  See ANDREW KERNOHAN, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS:  AN INTERACTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 194 (2012). 
65.  Denise Hassanzade Ajiri, Islamic Leaders Echo Pope’s Call for Action on 
Climate Change, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
Science/2015/0818/Islamic-leaders-echo-pope-s-call-for-action-on-climate-change 
[https://perma.cc/U6NX-66XZ]. 
66.  See P. Gardiner, A Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral Dilemmas in Medicine, 29 
J. MED. ETHICS 297 (2003). 
67.  See id. 
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application to a problem such as climate change may be 
impossibly anthropocentric and subjective.  However, at least 
one writer has suggested that the virtue ethics values of love, 
respect, and care may apply to the non-human environment as 
well.68 
In sum, once the remaining increment of non-catastrophic 
greenhouse gas emissions has been exhausted, there will be a 
compelling utilitarian ethical case for an outright ban on the 
burning of fossil fuels, based both on the avoidance of harm to 
people and on the ethic of non-interference with natural 
ecosystems.  Deontological and virtue ethics may also support 
such a ban, but with less certainty. 
B. The Practical Case:  Scientific Necessity 
Once the greenhouse gas increment is used up, it will be 
impossible to avoid catastrophic harms while continuing to 
burn fossil fuels.  Indeed, the two degrees Celsius of warming 
associated with that increment itself contemplates significant 
climate change and disruption to human settlement patterns, 
agriculture, and sea level.69  Once this point of unacceptable 
impacts is reached, there is no other possible response to the 
crisis of global climate change and sea level rise other than 
banning further fossil fuel combustion.  The possible 
alternative responses of geoengineering, carbon sequestration, 
or adaptation are likely to prove inadequate as alternative 
responses. 
Although geoengineering techniques, such as sulfate aerosol 
dispersal to increase atmospheric reflectivity to solar radiation, 
have been suggested as a lower cost means of mitigating 
climate change, the available science neither supports the 
effectiveness nor safety of these techniques.  A recent National 
Academy of Sciences report casts doubt on the feasibility of 
geoengineering as a practical matter—though it calls for 
further research.70  Available models suggest that 
geoengineering responses to climate change will have their own 
serious climate impacts, such as disruption of the Indian 
 
68.  See John O’Neill, The Varieties of Intrinsic Value, 75 MONIST 119 (1992); see 
also JOHN BARRY, RETHINKING GREEN POLITICS 32 (1999).  
69.  See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE IPCC IMPACTS ASSESSMENT 1–3 (1990).   
70.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE INTERVENTION:  CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL 
AND RELIABLE SEQUESTRATION 19–20 (2015). 
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monsoon essential to agricultural productivity on the Indian 
subcontinent.71  Geoengineering is also inherently unstable, as 
it depends on constant human intervention to maintain the 
climate.  If geoengineering efforts are halted for any reason—
such as war, unrest, or economic crises—extremely rapid and 
destructive climate change will follow.72 
Carbon sequestration and storage has also been suggested as 
an alternative measure that would allow continued use of fossil 
fuels—particularly coal—while mitigating the greenhouse gas 
impacts.  Although some demonstration carbon capture and 
storage (“CCS”) plants are up and running, none promise to be 
economically feasible or competitive with non-GHG emitting 
renewable energy.73 
The third alternative response to climate change—so-called 
adaptation—is also an unacceptable alternative to the 
cessation of fossil fuel use.  Adaptation measures propose to 
adjust human settlement and agricultural patterns to changing 
climate and rising sea level.74  They include such measures as 
relocating coastal communities and engineered shore protection 
measures to cope with sea level rise.75  The fundamental 
problem with reliance on adaptation measures is one of cost 
and resources; adaptation depends on financial resources to 
implement engineered responses to sea level rise as well as the 
availability of fertile land in newly-productive agricultural 
regions.  Such measures will be unavailable to the gravest 
 
71.  See David Shukman, Geo-engineering:  Climate Fixes “Could Harm Billions,” 
BBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-30197085 
[https://perma.cc/HLV4-SV84]. 
72.  Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Geoengineering Is Fast and Cheap, but Not the Key to 
Stopping Climate Change, GUARDIAN (May 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
sustainable-business/2015/may/15/geoengineering-climate-change-greenhouse-gases 
[https://perma.cc/MAT9-R5G5]. 
73.  Chris Nelder, Why Carbon Capture and Storage Will Never Pay Off, ZDNET 
(Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/article/why-carbon-capture-and-storage-will-
never-pay-off/ [https://perma.cc/HR2V-K3QB]; Ken Zweibel, Should Solar Photovoltaics 
Be Deployed Sooner Because of Long Operating Life at Low, Predictable Cost?, 38 
ENERGY POL’Y 7519, 7528 (2010) (discussing the competitive quality of photovoltaic 
systems as compared with traditional energy production). 
74.  See generally Ian Burton, Adaptation to Climate Change and Variability in the 
Context of Sustainable Development, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 153 (Luis 
Gómez-Echeverri ed., 2000), http://environment.yale.edu/publication-
series/documents/downloads/a-g/Burton.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU8R-WJL8]. 
75.  See, e.g., Mark Gibbs, Coastal Communities Need Implementable Plans—Even 
If Politically Unpopular, PHYS.ORG (Dec. 4, 2015), http://phys.org/news/2015-12-coastal-
planseven-politically-unpopular.html [https://perma.cc/XJA4-YDMJ]. 
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victims of climate change in the Global South, where refugees 
from rising sea level and desertification are likely to lack the 
resources and lands needed to adapt.76  Adaptation is a 
strategy for the wealthy nations, but is unlikely to work for 
poor nations.77  When it becomes clear that adaptation will not 
prevent the unacceptable humanitarian impacts of climate 
change, drastic mitigation measures will become necessary. 
C. The Pragmatic Case:  Realpolitik and Simplicity 
The history of effective environmental law reform is, 
unfortunately, one of reaction rather than proaction.  The 
Clean Air Act was adopted in response to smog-choked cities, 
the Clean Water Act in response to the Cuyahoga River in 
flames, and the Superfund cleanup law in response to the 
evacuation of contaminated communities at Love Canal and 
Times Beach.78  The current U.S. and international political 
climate suggests that an effective response to climate change is 
also likely to be reactive rather than proactive:  that is, 
effective measures to mitigate climate change are not likely to 
be adopted until after grave humanitarian crises 
unambiguously caused by climate change are apparent.79  At 
that point, by definition, any allocable increment of greenhouse 
gas emissions will have been used up.  A proactive allocation 
response to limit greenhouse gas emissions rates is also 
unlikely to be successful because allocation problems are the 
hardest problems for environmental regulation to solve, 
invoking both distributive justice issues and libertarian 
resistance to government direction of private activity. 
It appears nearly impossible that the global community, let 
alone the United States, will implement an allocation scheme 
 
76.  See Ruth Gordon, The Triumph and Failure of International Law, 34 N.C. 
CENT. L. REV. 63, 75 (2011). 
77.  See generally Alice Kaswan, Domestic Climate Change Adaptation and Equity, 
42 ENVTL. L. REP. 11125 (2012). 
78.  ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 465, 524, 679 (4th ed. 
2010). 
79.  See Nsikan Akpan et al., Why the Paris Talks Won’t Prevent 2 Degrees of Global 
Warming, PBS (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/why-the-paris-
talks-wont-prevent-2-degrees-of-global-warming/ [https://perma.cc/UAP5-4LUN] 
(“Even if aggressive deals are reached in Paris . . ., climate change could still be on 
track to drive millions from their homes through drought, famine, sea-level rise and 
extreme storms like cyclones.”). 
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for the remaining 565 gigatons of useable fossil fuels before the 
increment is already used up.  Several structural factors 
militate against successful enactment and implementation of 
an effective allocation scheme.  These include both the cultural 
cognition challenges facing the reality of climate science, the 
related tendency of major legislation to be responsive to an 
observed crisis rather than an anticipated one, along with the 
“super wicked” nature of the climate response problem—at 
least as long as it is defined as an allocation problem.80  The 
world appears destined to suffer at least some of the 
devastating impacts of climate change, and by the time a 
response is implemented, the only possible mitigation may be a 
complete ban on burning fossil fuels. 
1. Wicked and Super Wicked Problems 
Professor Richard Lazarus has famously described climate 
change as a “super wicked problem.”81  The term “wicked 
problem” was originally coined in the planning literature as a 
problem that cannot be defined without reference to potential 
solutions, leading to intractable path dependencies for 
pluralistic negotiation of problem definition and resolution.82  
The term has been expanded to include problems with multiple 
definitions, interdependence between problem definition and 
solution, and polycentric competing interests affected by both 
the problem and its proposed resolutions.83  Professor Lazarus 
describes climate change as a “super wicked problem” because 
climate change has the added complications of the cost of 
delayed action, the lack of incentive to act by the parties best 
positioned to address the problem, and the lack of sufficient 
governmental structures to respond to the scope of the 
problem.84  Significantly, Professor Lazarus anticipates that a 
successful legal response to climate change will require a 
“precommitment strategy” to remove the legal framework from 
 
80.  See Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:  Restraining 
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1178, 1181–82 (2009). 
81.  See id. at 1159. 
82.  See generally Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General 
Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155, 160–69 (1973) (introducing the term “wicked 
problems” to describe nature of social policy problems). 
83.  See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 80, at 1159–61.   
84.  See id. 
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the action of ordinary politics once the wrenching reallocations 
required by the response come into play.85 
By definition, “wicked problems” are those problems whose 
definition depends in part on the nature of the proposed 
solutions.86  So long as the solution to climate change remains 
an allocation scheme—whether it is allocation via carbon 
pricing schemes such as cap and trade or carbon taxes, 
allocation via rationing, or international allocation via 
negotiated allowances as in the Kyoto Accords87—climate 
change will remain a super wicked problem, as multiple 
solutions and multiple stakeholders compete for 
implementation and allocation.  The allocation problem 
necessarily becomes mired in intractable debates about the 
relative merits of carbon taxes versus a system of cap and 
trade,88 as well as the fundamental distributive justice 
problems involved in any allocation scheme.89  Moreover, any 
system of allocation of carbon emissions requires the 
construction of a highly-complex system of accounting and 
monitoring to ensure proper allocation of limits and 
compliance.90  On the other hand, climate change might cease 
to be a wicked problem if the global community—prompted by 
leadership from the most powerful nations—came to realize 
that burning fossil fuels in an industrialized world is always 
unsustainable and a violation of basic human values due to the 
harms it causes, as the global community eventually came to 
view slavery.91  If the solution is perceived to be as simple as a 
ban, the complexities and competing interests for allocation 
disappear, and the problem may no longer be “wicked.”  The 
practical question is whether—and when—such a global 
consensus might appear. 
As a practical matter, statutory bans have been more 
effective in U.S. environmental law than environmental 
 
85.  See id. at 1158.  
86.  See C. West Churchman, Wicked Problems, 14 MGMT. SCI. 151 (1967). 
87.  See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, FED. MINISTRY FOR ENV’T, NATURE CONSERVATION, 
BLDG. & NUCLEAR SAFETY, http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/ 
international-climate-policy/kyoto-protocol/ [https://perma.cc/89MU-LFWD] (last 
updated Oct. 23, 2015).  
88.  See Lazarus, supra note 80, at 1186. 
89.  Id. at 1185. 
90.  Id. at 1186. 
91.  See infra Section V.C.3. 
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quality-based allocation schemes.  The quality-based emissions 
allocation approaches of both the Clean Water Act and the 
Clean Air Act have failed on their own terms, with forty 
percent of U.S. water bodies still listed as impaired as of 2014 
and over 160 air quality areas still failing to meet national 
ambient air quality standards.92  It is no accident that these 
quality based regulatory schemes have not been fully 
implemented, as the allocation elements of compliance93 
require hard political choices about how to allocate scarce 
emissions resources.  Flat environmental prohibitions, such as 
the ban on taking endangered species94 or the ban on lead in 
gasoline implemented under the Clean Air Act,95 have been 
more effective in achieving their environmental goals.  
Addressing climate change at the global level poses even more 
intractable allocation challenges, as the developing nations 
have a compelling argument based on principles of distributive 
justice for larger allocations than the industrialized nations 
that are largely responsible for the problem, while the 
industrialized nations are loath to give up the economic 
advantages of their outsized share of global emissions.96  Barry 
Commoner, one of the founders of the late twentieth century 
environmentalist movement, argued decades ago for the 
simplicity and effectiveness of outright bans.97 
 
92.  See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLEAN WATER ACT AND 
POLLUTANT TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS 2 (2012), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42752.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WK2-JSQR]; Criteria 
Pollutant Nonattainment Summary Report, EPA (Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/ancl3.html#Notes [https://perma.cc/ TTT5-
VZVT] (listing nonattainment areas). 
93.  This includes Total Maximum Daily Loads under the Clean Water Act and 
State Implementation Plans under the Clean Air Act.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) 
(2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012). 
94.  The Endangered Species Act Works:  100 Success Stories, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa_works/ 
[https://perma.cc/HJT4-38NN] (last visited May 29, 2016) (“The Endangered Species 
Act is one of the most successful environmental laws in U.S. history and America’s 
foremost tool for protecting biodiversity.”).  But see infra notes 229–230 and 
accompanying text. 
95.  See infra notes 110–111 and accompanying text. 
96.  See Gordon, supra note 76, at 75. 
97.  Barry Commoner, Why We Have Failed, in LEARNING TO LISTEN TO THE LAND 
163, 164–65 (Bill Willers ed., 1991). 
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2. Cultural Cognition Challenges for a Law-Based Response 
to Climate Change 
As self-government evolves as a global norm, legislative 
response to social problems is increasingly dependent on 
achieving political consensus that action is required.  However, 
achievement of the level of political consensus necessary to 
support effective measures to mitigate climate change in the 
developed world must overcome several cognitive biases that 
militate against timely political consensus concerning the need 
to respond to climate change.  These cognitive biases include 
avoidance of cognitive dissonance, the availability heuristic, 
loss aversion, status quo preferences, optimism, confirmation 
bias, inability to process low-probability events, and framing.98  
In addition, what Professor Dan Kahan calls “cultural 
cognition,” or beliefs based on social group identification, works 
against acceptance of climate science by self-identified 
conservatives and Republicans in the United States.99 
These cognitive factors all militate against a strong 
legislative response to climate change, at least in the short-
term.  Even as public opinion polls show growing acceptance of 
climate science in the United States, these same polls continue 
to place climate change near the bottom of public rankings of 
the importance of the issue.100  This may be the availability 
heuristic at work:  without recent, visible examples of the harm 
caused by climate change, the issue will take a back seat to 
economic issues and violent conflicts.101 
Similarly, it is hard to think of another example where any 
system of government took action to prevent a predicted future 
cataclysm for which there was no past example.  Cassandra’s 
 
98.  See Karl S. Coplan, Climate Change, Political Truth, and the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 545, 553 (2012); see also GEORGE MARSHALL, DON’T EVEN 
THINK ABOUT IT:  WHY OUR BRAINS ARE WIRED TO IGNORE CLIMATE CHANGE 20 (2014). 
99.  See generally Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 149 (2006). 
100.  Coral Davenport & Marjorie Connelly, Most Republicans Say They Back 
Climate Action, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/ us/politics/most-americans-support-government-
action-on-climate-change-poll-finds.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WQZ3-DWSU]; Seth 
Motel, Polls Show Most Americans Believe in Climate Change, but Give It Low Priority, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/23/most-
americans-believe-in-climate-change-but-give-it-low-priority/ [https://perma.cc/M79M-
G5ME]. 
101.  See Coplan, supra note 98, at 554–55. 
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warnings to King Priam of Troy were absolutely correct but 
were ignored, and her name has ironically become synonymous 
with undue alarmism.102  Major legislative initiatives in the 
United States, as elsewhere, have all been taken in response to 
visible crises that were already under way:  the New Deal 
economic regulations and safety nets adopted in the wake of 
the Great Depression, civil rights legislation adopted in 
response to visible injustice and violence directed at African 
Americans, and our system of environmental regulation 
adopted in the wake of visible pollution disasters such as Love 
Canal, Times Beach, Missouri, and the Cuyahoga River in 
flames.103  No such legislative initiatives resulted from 
predictions of future harm in the absence of recent exemplars. 
This reactive nature of legislative initiative, unfortunately, 
suggests that any major legislative response will be deferred 
until the effects of climate change reach visible, unambiguous, 
crisis proportions.  No weather or climate event to date in the 
United States has reached such proportions.  Hurricanes 
Sandy and Katrina, summer heat waves, and unprecedented 
tornado outbreaks are not sufficiently certain to prompt this 
response.  The scientific consensus that supports anthropogenic 
climate change is lacking on the issue whether any of these 
specific weather events can be attributed to climate change as 
opposed to natural variability in weather.104 
It is hard to say when such a series of weather catastrophes 
sufficiently certain to be climate change-related will occur, but 
by definition they will not occur until catastrophic climate 
change is already upon us.105  In such case, it will already be 
too late for a system of allocation and rationing of fossil fuels:  
the world will surpass the 565 gigaton limit long before events 
prompt an effective legislative response.  As Bill McKibben’s 
 
102.  See Philip Davies, The Cassandra Complex:  How to Avoid Generating a 
Corporate Vision That No One Buys Into, in SUCCESS IN SIGHT:  VISIONING 103–04 
(1998) (describing mythology of Cassandra); Diego Gambetta, Reason and Terror, BOS. 
REV., April/May 2004, http://bostonreview.net/us/diego-gambetta-reason-and-terror 
[https://perma.cc/3QUR-LAVS] (stating that many people do not want to be seen as an 
undue alarmist like Cassandra). 
103.  PLATER, supra note 78. 
104.  Kevin E. Trenberth et al., Attribution of Climate Extreme Events, 5 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 725 (2015). 
105.  See Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation:  
Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010). 
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analysis has pointed out, the world is on track to exceed this 
increment by 2030.106 
As this increment is passed and global temperatures 
continue to rise, the grievous humanitarian harms of global 
climate change will eventually become apparent and 
undeniable.  Once a pattern of extreme weather events such as 
heat waves, floods, storms, and coastal inundation becomes 
undeniable, the U.S. political system may be expected to reach 
consensus and respond to the threat as it ultimately did to the 
extreme environmental disasters of the mid-twentieth century.  
At that point, there will likely be a political consensus that a 
response to climate change is necessary.  There will be no 
increment of greenhouse gas emissions left to allocate, and a 
ban on fossil fuels will be the only effective mitigation against 
further, more severe climate impacts. 
IV. EFFECTUATING THE BAN 
Assuming that at some point in the future a political 
consensus supporting a ban on fossil fuels develops, there 
remains the question of what legal form such a ban would take.  
While the most obvious vehicle for such a ban would appear to 
be federal legislation under the commerce or treaty powers, 
there is the possibility of effectuating such a ban 
administratively under the existing authority to regulate motor 
vehicle fuels under the Clean Air Act’s section 211, or by 
designating greenhouse gases as a criteria pollutant under 
Title I of the Act and imposing a ban as part of a federal 
implementation plan.  Keeping in mind Professor Lazarus’s 
suggestion that the social resistance to greenhouse gas 
regulations might require a precommitment strategy that 
removes the ban from ordinary political processes,107 we should 
consider the possibility of effectuating such a ban via 
constitutional amendment or statutory independent agency.  
This Part of the Article will summarize possible sources of legal 
authority to accomplish such a ban in the United States, 
keeping in mind that decades may pass before such a ban is 
 
106.  Bill McKibben, Why I’ll Get Arrested to Stop the Burning of Coal, YALE ENV’T 
360 (Feb. 19, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/why_ill_get_arrested_to_stop_the_ 
burning_of_ coal/2124/ [https://perma.cc/HV8D-2F35]. 
107.  See Lazarus, supra note 80, at 1158. 
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accomplished and that the state of law will undoubtedly change 
between now and then. 
A. Existing Statutory Authority 
Some of the most effective U.S. regulatory environmental 
responses have taken the form of outright bans on products or 
activities implemented pursuant to statutory authority broad 
enough to encompass such bans.  The Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) banned the use of the pesticide 
DDT—with a limited public health exception—in 1972 under 
the existing authority of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act with a prod from the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.108  The DDT ban is credited with restoring 
endangered populations of peregrine falcons and bald eagles.109  
Similarly, EPA banned lead additives in gasoline in 1996 under 
the Clean Air Act’s section 211, which allows EPA to ban fuel 
additives as well as fuels.110  The ban on lead additives had 
huge public health benefits, and may even be responsible for 
the decline in crime rates in the early years of the twenty-first 
century.111  EPA has also banned the manufacture and use of 
polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) under the authority of the 
Toxic Substances Control Act.112 
Although it may not currently be politically exercisable, 
existing authority under the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to 
ban the use of fossil fuels, both for mobile and stationary 
sources.  Clean Air Act section 211 grants EPA broad authority 
to prohibit the sale of specific motor vehicle fuels, while Title I 
of the Clean Air Act allows EPA to establish National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for criteria pollutants and a 
 
108.  Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
109.  Scott W. Reed, Fish Gotta Swim:  Establishing Legal Rights to Instream Flows 
Through the Endangered Species Act and the Public Trust Doctrine, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 
645, 652–53 (1992) (citing MICHAEL BEAN, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM, 
AUDUBON WILDLIFE REPORT 369–70 (1986)). 
110.  See Prohibition on Gasoline Containing Lead or Lead Additives for Highway 
Use, 61 Fed. Reg. 3,832, 3,832 (Feb. 2, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80); 
Regulation of Fuels, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(n) (2012). 
111.  Rick Nevin, How Lead Exposure Relates to Temporal Changes in IQ, Violent 
Crime, and Unwed Pregnancy, 83 ENVTL. RES. 1, 21 (2000). 
112.  See Polychlorinated Biphenyls Manufacturing, Processing, Distribution in 
Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 40 C.F.R. pt. 761 (2016). 
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federal implementation plan to achieve such standards where 
state implementation plans are unable to do so. 
1. Clean Air Act Section 211:  Prohibition of Motor Vehicle 
Fuels 
Clean Air Act section 211(c) provides that: 
 
The Administrator may, from time to time on the basis of 
information obtained under subsection (b) of this section or other 
information available to him, by regulation, control or prohibit 
the manufacture, introduction into commerce, offering for sale, or 
sale of any fuel or fuel additive for use in a motor vehicle, motor 
vehicle engine, or nonroad engine if, in the judgment of the 
Administrator, any fuel or fuel additive or any emission product 
of such fuel or fuel additive causes or contributes to air 
pollution . . . that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the 
public health or welfare . . . .113 
 
This section gives EPA the clear authority to ban the 
manufacture or sale of fossil fuels for motor vehicle and 
nonroad engines.  All fossil fuels generate carbon dioxide as an 
emissions product.114  Carbon dioxide is the principle 
greenhouse gas.115  Greenhouse gases are clearly air pollutants 
and cause air pollution; the Supreme Court so held in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.116  The Administrator has already made 
a determination that greenhouse gas pollution endangers the 
public health and welfare.117  This finding was sustained 
against industry challenge by the D.C. Circuit118 and left 
undisturbed by the Court.119 
Section 211(c)(2) requires that, before imposing such a ban, 
the Administrator must consider all relevant scientific and 
 
113.  42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (2012). 
114.  Overview of Greenhouse Gases:  Carbon Dioxide Emissions, EPA, 
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.html 
[https://perma.cc/F4KM-HAGN] (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
115.  Id. 
116.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also Overview of EPA 
Endangerment Finding, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/climate/overview-epa-
endangerment-finding [https://perma.cc/Y4NQ-QBBD] (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).  
117.  Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496–546 (Dec. 15, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I). 
118.  Delta Constr. Co. v. EPA, 783 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
119.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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medical data, make a further finding that emissions controls 
cannot prevent air pollution causing the endangerment, and 
make a further finding that the ban of a fuel under this section 
will not cause the use of substitute fuels that cause a greater 
endangerment.120  It would seem that the Administrator could 
make such findings—there is no conceivable emissions control 
(such as carbon capture and storage) that might control carbon 
dioxide emissions from mobile sources, and non-fossil fuel 
substitutes such as electric power, hydrogen fuels, or biomass-
derived liquid fuels would not cause greater greenhouse gas 
impacts than fossil fuels. 
2. Clean Air Act Title I National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards 
Section 211 of the Clean Air Act is limited to transportation 
fuels, so it would not provide complete authority to EPA to 
prohibit the use of fossil fuels in other economic sectors, 
particularly the electrical generation, agricultural, and cement 
production sectors.  However, the NAAQS regulatory program 
for criteria pollutants under Title I of the Clean Air Act would 
provide sufficient authority to prohibit the use of fossil fuels in 
this sector, as well, for an EPA inclined to exploit its authority 
to the fullest. 
Clean Air Act Title I establishes a program of health and 
welfare based ambient air quality standards, the NAAQS.121  
States must develop plans—State Implementation Plans 
(“SIP”)—designed to bring air quality within the state into 
compliance with these standards.122  If EPA determines that a 
State’s implementation plan will not achieve compliance with 
an air quality standard, EPA may adopt a Federal 
Implementation Plan (“FIP”) with federally enforceable control 
measures that would apply within the state.123 
Section 108 of the Clean Air Act provides for the designation 
of criteria pollutants for which NAAQS will be established.  
 
120.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2) (2012). 
121.  See Key Federal Laws:  The Clean Air Act, CHEMALLIANCE.ORG, 
http://www.chemalliance.org/tools/?subsec=25 [https://perma.cc/NX79-KBWV] (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2016).   
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. 
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This section directs the Administrator of EPA to establish the 
criteria pollutants list for those air pollutants: 
 
(A) emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare; 
(B) the presence of which in the ambient air results from 
numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources; and 
(C) for which air quality criteria had not been issued before 
December 31, 1970 but for which he plans to issue air quality 
criteria under this section.124 
 
As noted, EPA has already made the finding that greenhouse 
gases endanger public health and welfare.125  In a 1976 case, 
NRDC v. Train, the Second Circuit held that despite the 
conditional last sentence of this provision, once the 
Administrator has made the endangerment finding for a 
pollutant under any other section of the Act, listing of that 
pollutant as a criteria pollutant becomes mandatory.126  
Whether listing of GHGs as criteria pollutants is mandatory or 
discretionary, the Administrator clearly has the discretionary 
authority under section 108 to list them based on the prior 
endangerment finding. 
If GHGs were listed as criteria pollutants, the Administrator 
would be charged with developing the NAAQS for GHGs.127  
Because the endangerment finding for GHGs was based on 
health concerns and public welfare concerns, the Administrator 
would be charged with establishing primary NAAQS for these 
pollutants.128  The primary NAAQS must be set at a level that, 
 
124.  42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2012). 
125.  See Overview of EPA Endangerment Finding, supra note 116.  
126.  Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1976); CTR. FOR 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY & 350.ORG, PETITION TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL POLLUTION 
LIMITS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES PURSUANT TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2009), 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/global_warming_liti
gation/clean_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7JXH-6FK4]; Zachary D. Ludens, Stemming a Rising Tide:  Why the 
Clean Air Act Following Massachusetts v. EPA Provides a Sensible Vehicle Through 
Which to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 251 (2013); Patricia 
Ross McCubbin, EPA’s Endangerment Finding For Greenhouse Gases and the Potential 
Duty to Adopt National Ambient Air Quality Standards to Address Global Climate 
Change, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 437 (2009). 
127.  42 U.S.C. § 7408. 
128.  42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012). 
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“allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect 
the public health.”129  Based on current science, a limit of 
somewhere between 350 and 400 ppm of CO2e in the 
atmosphere is necessary to prevent the most catastrophic 
health impacts of global warming.130 
Once a NAAQS for GHGs were established, each State would 
be charged with amending its SIP to demonstrate compliance 
with the GHG NAAQS within three years.131  Of course, due to 
the global nature of greenhouse gas emissions, no SIP could 
possibly demonstrate compliance with a GHG NAAQS, as 
atmospheric GHG concentrations are beyond the control of any 
one State.  EPA could thus use its authority under section 
110(c) of the Clean Air Act to reject the SIPs as inadequate and 
to adopt a nationwide FIP for GHGs.132  EPA has broad 
discretion to incorporate measures necessary to achieve a 
primary NAAQS.  As with the SIPs, a FIP: 
 
Shall . . . include enforceable emissions limitations and other 
control measures, means, or techniques (including economic 
incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of 
emissions rights) . . . as may be necessary or appropriate to meet 
the applicable requirements . . . .133 
Regulations included in a FIP are federally enforceable.134  
This authority appears broad enough to include a ban on fossil 
fuels as the only effective means to meet a NAAQS for GHGs. 
There is precedent for EPA using the FIP process to address 
intractable interstate air pollution issues that are beyond the 
reach of individual state SIPs.  In 1998, EPA issued the so-
called “NOx SIP Call,” requiring States to revise their SIPs in 
order to address ozone NAAQS violations in downwind states, 
as required by the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act.135  
 
129.  Id. 
130.  See The Science, 350.ORG, http://350.org/about/science/ 
[https://perma.cc/NVH3-4JZH] (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
131.  42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2012). 
132.  See 40 C.F.R. pt. 62 (2016) (setting forth the Administrator’s approval and 
disapproval of SIP plans based on satisfaction of the requirements of the relevant 
section of the Clean Air Act). 
133.  42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2012). 
134.  Id. § 7410(a)(5)(A)(i). 
135.  See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in 
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional 
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (providing the final NOx SIP 
Call).  
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EPA’s authority to issue the SIP call was upheld in Michigan v. 
EPA.136  When States failed to submit adequate revisions, EPA 
imposed a FIP that incorporated an interstate emissions 
trading scheme—the Clean Air Interstate Rule (“CAIR”).137  
Although portions of the CAIR were struck down on judicial 
review, EPA’s basic authority to implement a FIP with detailed 
regulatory requirements for individual pollution sources was 
upheld.138 
The successor rule to the CAIR, the Cross-State Air 
Transport Rule, maintains these regulations and the interstate 
trading scheme adopted by the CAIR, and this approach 
survived review by the Supreme Court.139  In another 
interstate pollution situation, the EPA adopted the Regional 
Haze Rule, requiring reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions at 
power plants in states that were upwind of national parks and 
other areas designated for exceptional air clarity.140  EPA 
subsequently rejected inadequate SIP submissions for 
compliance with the regional haze emissions limits and instead 
imposed its own individual emissions limits for individual 
power plants as part of a FIP.141  These FIP limits were upheld 
by the Tenth Circuit in Oklahoma v. EPA.142 
Although it might be argued that a FIP banning fossil fuel 
use nationwide might itself be insufficient to make progress 
towards achieving a hypothetical GHG NAAQS, given the 
global nature of the problem, it seems unlikely that any court 
would strike down such a FIP on the grounds that it was 
insufficiently rigorous.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has held 
that a SIP—and implicitly a FIP—need not take technological 
or economic feasibility into account in establishing limits on 
emissions.143 
 
136.  Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).   
137.  See Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), EPA, http://archive.epa.gov/ 
airmarkets/programs/cair/web/html/index.html [https://perma.cc/CFX7-HEE6] (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2016) (describing CAIR and stating that it was replaced in 2015 by the 
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule). 
138.  North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
139.  EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).  
140.  Regional Haze Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714 (July 1, 1999) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51). 
141.  Id. 
142.  Oklahoma v. EPA, 723 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013). 
143.  Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
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At least theoretically, then, existing statutory authority 
under the Clean Air Act would allow EPA to ban the use of 
fossil fuels in both mobile and stationary sources.  Imposition of 
such a ban through administrative action by an executive 
agency would fall within the long tradition of presidential 
executive actions in response to crises, such as President 
Lincoln’s adoption of the Emancipation Proclamation and 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s imposition of bank holidays 
during the Great Depression.144  Action pursuant to existing 
statutory authority such as the Clean Air Act, in response to a 
global crisis such as catastrophic climate change, would make 
such executive action relatively likely to survive judicial 
review.145  Nevertheless, such action could not be taken unless 
the national political climate were sufficiently favorable to 
avoid congressional action repealing EPA authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions.146 
B. New Legislation 
Although the Clean Air Act likely provides sufficient 
authority for the Executive Branch to effectuate a near-
complete ban on the use of fossil fuels, a future President 
seeking to implement such a ban may wish to have more 
specific legislative authority, or it may be that a future 
Congress may take the lead in implementing climate 
protections.  Indeed, the great environmental protection 
initiatives of the early 1970s—NEPA, the Clean Air Act, and 
the Clean Water Act—were all legislative initiatives taken with 
the reluctant cooperation of President Nixon.147  Past 
legislation illustrates the effectiveness of statutory bans in 
achieving environmental results.  Congress could ban the sale 
 
144.  See President Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/emancipation_proclamation/inde
x.html [https://perma.cc/WB8C-NYEB]; President Franklin Roosevelt, Proclamation 
2040—Bank Holidays (Mar. 9, 1933), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14485 
[https://perma.cc/6SZZ-5G86]. 
145.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
146.  S. 66, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 4813, 113th Cong. (2014); S.J. Res. 30, 113th 
Cong. (2014); H.R. Con. Res. 57, 113th Cong. (2014). 
147.  Although President Nixon created the EPA and signed the 1970 Clean Air Act 
into law, he vetoed the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (now 
known as the Clean Water Act), which was passed over his veto.  See Domestic Politics, 
PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/nixon-
domestic/ [https://perma.cc/ZF3Q-P6UK] (last visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
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or use of fossil fuels in the exercise of its power to regulate 
interstate commerce or as an exercise of the treaty power 
(assuming an international treaty banning fossil fuels were 
negotiated).148  Although there might be constitutional 
objections to such a ban based on the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment or based on a claim of deprivation of some 
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, such claims are unlikely to succeed.  As with 
other absolute bans, there is some risk that exceptions and 
bypass provisions will be adopted legislatively, 
administratively, or judicially. 
1. Statutory Bans 
Congress has in the past reacted to environmental crises by 
adopting statutory bans on environmentally harmful activities.  
Such bans have included the Endangered Species Act’s 
prohibition against taking or trading in endangered species, 
the “Delaney Clause” prohibition against cancer causing 
chemical residues in food products, and the phaseout of ozone 
depleting chlorofluorocarbons.149  Such legislative bans are 
almost certainly within the scope of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power, and might also be effectuated under the Treaty 
Clause power.  Although some have questioned whether Fifth 
Amendment takings compensation might be due to holders of 
fossil fuel reserves in the event of such a ban,150 existing 
precedent precludes a claim for such compensation.151  
However, such statutory bans on ubiquitous activities tend to 
provoke bypass provisions and exceptions—whether created by 
 
148.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
149.  See Endangered Species Act § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012); Food Additives 
Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, § 4, 72 Stat. 1784, 1785–86 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2012)); Phaseout of Class I Ozone-Depleting Substances, 
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ods-phaseout/phaseout-class-i-ozone-depleting-substances 
[https://perma.cc/H96D-N8RZ] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).  
150.  Nicholas S. Cortese, Note, Drawing Lines in the Shale:  Local Zoning Bans, the 
Takings Clause, and the Clash to Come If New York State Promulgates Hydrofracking 
Regulations, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 489, 508 (2014); Christopher Hayes, The New 
Abolitionism, NATION (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/new-
abolitionism/ [https://perma.cc/C2X7-KKB7]; Mireya Navarro, New York Judge Rules 
Town Can Ban Gas Hydrofracking, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/nyregion/town-can-ban-hydrofracking-ny-judge-
rules.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2PSP-AYGA]. 
151.  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
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legislation, administrative rulemaking, or judicial 
interpretation. 
a. Constitutional Authority 
i. Commerce Authority 
Most environmental regulation and prior statutory bans have 
been implemented as an exercise of Congress’s commerce 
power.  The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress “to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, 
and with the Indian tribes.”152  This grant of authority to 
regulate commerce has expanded over the years to include 
plenary authority to regulate in three categories related to 
interstate movement of goods and value:  (1) instrumentalities 
of commerce—that is, objects moving in commerce and the 
transportation infrastructure that moves them, (2) channels of 
commerce, and (3) activities which, in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce.153  The Supreme 
Court’s modern decisions have put a further gloss on this third 
category, requiring that the effect on commerce be 
“substantial,” that the regulated activity itself be “economic” 
activity, and implicitly, that the power claimed by Congress not 
be so broad as to usurp the general police powers reserved to 
the States under our system of federalism.154  Under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress enjoys such legislative 
powers as are “appropriate” to implement its regulation of 
commerce.155 
The Court upheld Congress’s exercise of the third category of 
the commerce power to adopt general environmental protection 
legislation in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass’n.156  In Hodel, coal mining trade associations and States 
challenged provisions of the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act requiring that surface mine operators restore 
and revegetate land disturbed by surface mining activities.157  
The Court had no trouble finding that the environmental 
 
152.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
153.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
154.  Id. at 559. 
155.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 38 (2005); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
316, 415 (1819). 
156.  Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
157.  Id. at 268. 
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effects of surface mining had an impact on interstate commerce 
sufficient to invoke the commerce power, and the Court 
specifically endorsed the rationale that uniform national 
environmental standards were an appropriate limitation on 
economic competition by States to lower their environmental 
standards.158 
Nevertheless, Congress’s power to protect environmental 
values pursuant to the Commerce Clause is not unlimited.  The 
Court has in recent decades limited the scope of the commerce 
power, albeit in non-environmental contexts.  In United States 
v. Lopez, the Court struck down provisions of the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act that criminalized mere possession of a 
firearm on school grounds, holding that Congress may not 
regulate non-economic activity, such as mere possession of an 
object, based on inferences about the aggregate impacts of such 
conduct on interstate commerce.159  Likewise, in United States 
v. Morrison, the Court struck down provisions of the Violence 
Against Women Act making certain acts of violence committed 
against women a federal crime, rejecting congressional findings 
that violence against women throughout society had a 
substantial impact on interstate commerce.160 
These cases suggest that the Court will not uphold regulation 
of non-economic activity under the Commerce Clause based 
solely on an aggregate impact of the activity on the national 
economy.  These cases may cast some doubt upon Congress’s 
power to protect environmental values from private, non-
business conduct.  Indeed, Chief Justice John Roberts, then 
sitting as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, expressed doubt that the 
Endangered Species Act could constitutionally be applied to a 
property owner’s fence construction that potentially interfered 
with the habitat of an endangered toad that lived only in 
California.161 
Clearly, Congress would have the authority to ban the 
quintessentially economic activities of purchasing and selling 
 
158.  Id. at 280. 
159.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
160.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
161.  See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(Roberts, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1159 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (referring to fence 
construction as non-economic activity like gun possession).  
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fossil fuels pursuant to the Commerce Clause as well as 
quintessentially commercial activities such as importation and 
interstate transportation of fossil fuels.  There can be no 
serious question that fossil fuel sales and commerce, as well as 
the climate change impacts of greenhouse gases, substantially 
affect the national economy.  There may be a wrinkle when it 
comes to a ban on fossil hydrocarbons for fuel use.  
Hydrocarbons have commercial uses other than as fuels, such 
as chemical feedstocks for manufacturing and fertilizers.162  A 
ban on fossil fuels would have to allow for commerce in fossil 
hydrocarbons for non-fuel, non-GHG generating uses, while 
simultaneously banning the use of such fossil hydrocarbons for 
GHG-emitting energy production.  Such a ban on the private 
use of an otherwise lawful substance might arguably be 
considered non-economic conduct beyond the reach of the 
commerce power, just like the fence construction in the 
challenge to the Endangered Species Act prohibition against 
taking an endangered species. 
The Supreme Court addressed the question of bans on 
personal possession and use of illicit drugs under the 
Controlled Substances Act in Gonzales v. Raich and held that 
individual possession bans were authorized under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution as an 
appropriate means of implementing the comprehensive 
regulation of an interstate market in illicit drugs.163  The Court 
reached this conclusion despite the premise that such 
possession and use was not an economic activity and would not 
be subject to commerce power regulation except for its 
connection to the interstate market in illicit drugs.164  Raich 
thus suggests that Congress might ban individual possession 
and use of fossil fuels as part of an overall ban on the 
manufacture, transport, or sale of fossil fuels in interstate 
commerce.  Raich does not fully address the question of 
whether the commerce power authorizes Congress to regulate 
the possession or use of a substance for particular purposes 
(such as the use of fossil hydrocarbons as fuel rather an as 
 
162.  See Overview of Greenhouse Gases:  Nitrous Oxide Emissions, EPA, 
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/n2o.html 
[https://perma.cc/3AM7-W8TT] (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
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chemical feedstocks).  Nonetheless, the Controlled Substances 
Act also prohibits possession of certain specified drugs for illicit 
purposes—i.e., the possession or use of prescription drugs 
without a prescription.165  Raich only addressed the 
constitutional validity of the total ban on possession or use of 
Schedule I controlled substances.  However, its reasoning that 
such a ban is “necessary and proper” to implement regulation 
of the interstate market in these drugs is arguably broad 
enough to support a ban on possession or use for particular 
purposes. 
The Court’s more recent decision rejecting the commerce 
power as authority for enactment of the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”)—National Federation of Independent Business v 
Sebelius166—might also be read as casting some doubt on 
Congress’s authority to regulate private, non-commercial 
conduct, such as the use of fossil fuels for heating or 
transportation purposes.  In Sebelius, the Court held that the 
individual mandate provision of the ACA was not a valid 
exercise of the commerce power or the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.167  The individual mandate provision of the ACA 
requires all individuals, subject to certain income limitations, 
to purchase health insurance.168  The Court held that neither 
the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause 
could be construed to reach individual inactivity and require 
affirmative conduct such as the purchase of a service in the 
market.169  As far as the commerce power was concerned, the 
Court held that inactivity was by its very nature non-economic 
and thus not subject to regulation based on aggregate 
substantial impacts on the national economy.170  As far as the 
necessary and proper power was concerned, the Court held that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause could not be read to invoke a 
“great substantive and independent power,” such as a 
regulation requiring affirmative activity.171  A ban on the use of 
fossil fuels would not seem to run directly afoul of Sebelius, as 
Congress would clearly be regulating activity rather than 
 
165.  21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012). 
166.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
167.  Id. at 2587. 
168.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012). 
169.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587, 2592. 
170.  Id. at 2589. 
171.  Id. at 2591. 
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inactivity.  However, the Court’s expansive notion of what 
individual conduct counts as “non-economic” might plausibly be 
argued to preclude regulation of private, noncommercial 
individual use of fossil hydrocarbons.172 
ii. Treaty Power 
In order to be effective in mitigating global climate change, a 
ban on fossil fuels will necessarily have to reflect a global 
consensus that such a ban is necessary.  Such a consensus is 
also likely to find reflection in an international treaty to which 
the United States will be a party.  The treaty power—combined 
with Congress’s implementation authority under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause—would be an obvious alternative source of 
legislative authority to implement an international ban on the 
use of fossil fuels. 
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution grants the 
President the “Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur.”173  Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of 
the Constitution provides that “[t]he Congress shall have 
Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and 
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government 
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”174  As the treaty power is one of the powers vested by 
the Constitution in the U.S. government, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, by its terms, authorizes Congress to adopt 
legislation to execute the treaty power. 
In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
combined treaty power and Necessary and Proper Clause 
expansively.175  The Court upheld federal legislation limiting 
hunting seasons for migratory waterfowl as a necessary and 
proper means of implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty 
between the United States and the United Kingdom (on behalf 
of Canada).176  According to the Court, “[i]f the treaty is valid 
 
172.  See generally James R. May, Healthcare, Environmental Law, and the 
Supreme Court, 43 ENVTL. L. 233 (2013). 
173.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
174.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
175.  See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).  
176.  See id. at 435. 
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there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute” that 
implements it “as a necessary and proper means to execute the 
powers of the Government.”177  The Court rejected a Tenth 
Amendment challenge to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act that 
was based on the States’ traditional exclusive role in regulating 
the hunting of wild animals.178 
Missouri v. Holland remains the Court’s only direct 
statement on the scope of Congress’s power to implement U.S. 
treaties through domestic legislation.  There is an implicit limit 
on the scope of the Holland holding, in that the underlying 
treaty must be “valid” and must deal with a subject that is an 
appropriate matter for an agreement among nations.  The 
Court had no trouble finding that the protection of migratory 
birds that transit across international boundaries was an 
appropriate matter for an international treaty.  So, too, would a 
limitation on the use of fossil fuels whose emissions cross 
international boundaries and which are causing a global 
climate crisis be an appropriate matter for an international 
treaty.  Indeed, greenhouse gas emissions are already subject 
of one international treaty to which the United States is a 
signatory—the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.179  In addition, the principle that all nations 
have an obligation to limit pollution emissions within their 
borders that cause harmful impacts beyond their borders is 
now a well-established principle of customary international 
law.180  Indeed, the case widely seen as establishing the 
customary international law principle against cross-boundary 
pollution, the Trail Smelter Arbitration, is directly applicable 
to the cross-boundary pollution issues of climate change.181  It 
would appear that under existing law, Congress would have 
ample authority to implement a ban on the use of fossil fuels as 
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a means of implementing an international treaty adopting such 
a ban. 
It is hard to predict whether the expansive treaty 
implementation power of Missouri v. Holland will survive until 
fossil fuel abolition becomes a political reality.  The Court 
recently avoided revisiting Missouri v. Holland in Bond v. 
United States.182  Bond addressed the application of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 to 
a domestic crime of attempted poisoning with a chemical 
substance.183  A majority of the Court declined to address the 
scope of the necessary and proper power to implement a treaty 
by criminalizing conduct traditionally regulated by the 
States.184  Rather, the Court applied the “clear statement” rule 
of avoiding constitutional issues by interpreting the statute 
narrowly, as being inapplicable to Bond’s purely domestic 
criminal conduct.185  Three Justices dissented however, and 
would have reached—and narrowed—the scope of the Treaty 
Clause implementation power.186  Justice Scalia’s dissent 
reasoned that the Necessary and Proper Clause literally only 
authorizes legislation that supports the making of treaties, and 
not legislation supporting the implementation of a treaty once 
made.187  This reasoning would overrule Missouri v. Holland 
and would not authorize implementing legislation effectuating 
a hypothetical international treaty banning the use of fossil 
fuels.  Justice Thomas’s dissent in Bond would limit the treaty 
power itself to authorize only treaties dealing with conduct of 
relations between nations, rejecting any treaty that purports to 
address the conduct of individual citizens.188  Under Justice 
Thomas’s approach, a treaty prohibiting the use of fossil fuels 
would be beyond the scope of the treaty power.  It remains to be 
seen whether either of these positions ultimately garners the 
support of a majority on the Court. 
 
182.  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098 (2014). 
183.  Id. at 2083. 
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b. Constitutional Objections 
Whether a ban on fossil fuels is implemented legislatively or 
administratively, there will likely be constitutional objections 
made to the ban.  Some commentators have questioned 
whether owners of fossil fuel reserves should be entitled to 
compensation for the loss of value of their assets.189  Under 
current law, such a claim is not likely to succeed under the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.190  Constitutional 
resistance to the ban on fossil fuels might also take the form of 
a fundamental rights based claim, most likely based on the 
right to travel. 
i. Takings 
Oil, gas, and coal reserves reported by energy sector 
companies represent approximately five times more burnable 
carbon than can safely be converted to greenhouse gas carbon 
dioxide without exceeding the two degrees Celsius that the 
IPCC considers the maximum survivable increase in planetary 
temperatures.191  An effective response to climate change—
which, as explained above, is most likely to take the form of a 
ban on fossil fuels once the increment is reached—will 
effectively require that these reserves largely be left in the 
ground.  This has led to discussion in the financial press about 
whether these energy companies are overvalued by a market 
that continues to attribute value to these unburnable 
reserves—a so-called fossil fuel asset bubble.192  This situation 
led Christopher Hayes to suggest that these energy companies 
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may be entitled to compensation should climate regulations 
destroy the value of their assets.193 
There is some historical precedent for compensating asset 
holders for the loss of value associated with a radical 
restructuring of economic arrangements.  When Great Britain 
abolished slavery in its colonies in 1833, the legislation 
provided for approximately twenty million pounds of 
compensation to be paid to the slaveholders—the equivalent of 
16.5 billion pounds in 2013.194  This payout represented forty 
percent of the annual spending budget of Great Britain at the 
time.195  The United States, of course, did not pay compensation 
to slaveholders upon the adoption of the Emancipation 
Proclamation or the Thirteenth Amendment. 
If anything, the business of extracting and selling fossil fuels 
may seem to be less inherently morally repugnant than the 
business of buying, selling, and forcing the labor of human 
beings.  At first blush, the fossil fuel industry’s legal and 
fairness-based claims for compensation may seem stronger 
than those of the nineteenth century slaveholders.  Fifth 
Amendment Takings doctrine, however, would not support a 
claim for compensation by owners of stranded fossil fuel assets.  
A government ban on fossil fuels would not constitute a 
physical appropriation or destruction of personal property by 
the government, so a traditional takings claim would not lie.196  
The Supreme Court long ago rejected a takings claim in an 
analogous case of regulatory asset obsolescence in Mugler v. 
Kansas.197  In Mugler, a distillery owner argued unsuccessfully 
that Kansas’s prohibition against the production or sale of 
alcoholic beverages constituted an unconstititutional taking of 
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the distillery, which was rendered worthless by the ban.198  
Mugler has been applied more recently by lower courts to reject 
takings claims based on the value-destroying effects of fishing 
quotas on trawlers199 and double-hull safety requirements on 
newly obsolete single-hulled oil barges.200  In Andrus v. Allard, 
the Supreme Court rejected a takings challenge asserted 
against the Endangered Species Act prohibition against the 
sale or interstate transportation of articles made from 
endangered species.201  A ban on the sale and use of fossil fuels 
would seem to present a weaker claim for compensation than 
the claim rejected in Allard, as such a ban would not eliminate 
all possible marketable uses for fossil fuels.  For example, 
crude oil would still be a valuable feedstock for chemical, 
fertilizer, and plastics production. 
A fairness-based claim for compensation is also less than 
compelling.  The political system owes business corporations no 
duty to protect asset values against obsolescence.  Anyone 
investing in fossil fuel reserves since the turn of the twenty-
first century has done so with full knowledge of the scientific 
consensus that an effective response to global warming would 
entail severe restrictions on the continued use of fossil fuels.  
The entire theory of our capitalist free market economic system 
is that those who invest in a business with full knowledge of 
the existential threats facing that business deserve no 
protection from their market losses.202 
ii. Fundamental Rights 
Legislation that effects a radical social or economic 
restructuring not uncommonly meets judicial resistance, often 
in the form of recognition or expansion of previously 
unrecognized “fundamental rights” protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
Thus, the Missouri Compromise, seeking to confine slavery to 
the existing southern states, spawned the Court’s expanded 
recognition of the substantive property rights of slave owners 
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protected by the Due Process Clause in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford.203  Wage and hour legislation empowering workers 
in relation to their employers was held to violate a substantive 
right to “freedom of contract” in Lochner v. New York.204  State 
and federal attempts to limit the traditional power of moneyed 
interests in politics gave rise to cases such as First National 
Bank v. Bellotti and Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Commission, recognizing and expanding a right to political 
expression on the part of business corporations.205  Even the 
National Federation of Independent Business case, rejecting the 
commerce power justification for the Affordable Care Act’s 
restructuring of the health care industry in the United States, 
can be read as an implicit endorsement of an unrecognized 
right to refrain from entering into a contract, as Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion for the majority in that case reasoned that to 
force individuals to purchase health insurance involved the 
exercise of a “great substantive and independent power” 
beyond the scope of the powers implied by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause of the Constitution.206 
It can be expected that a restructuring of the energy economy 
as extreme as a ban on the use of fossil fuels will attract some 
sort of rights-based constitutional challenge.  Recognition of an 
autonomy-based fundamental right to burn fossil fuels seems a 
bit far-fetched under current Supreme Court doctrine, which 
has resisted expansion of autonomy-based fundamental rights 
to include practices that cause harms that the legislature seeks 
to limit.  Thus, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court declined 
to recognize an autonomy-based fundamental right to life-
ending medical choices.207  Similarly, the Court limited the 
extent of its protection of the free exercise of religion when 
confronted with a religious practice—peyote use—deemed by 
the legislature to be harmful.208 
A more likely vehicle for a rights-based challenge to a ban on 
the use of fossil fuels might be a claim of an impermissible 
burden on the constitutionally recognized right to interstate 
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travel.  The right to travel has a long pedigree, having first 
been recognized by Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 
which held that “the right of a citizen of one state to pass 
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, 
agriculture and professional pursuits” is a privilege or 
immunity protected by Article IV, Section 2 of the 
Constitution.209  This right of free interstate movement was 
likewise recognized in The Slaughterhouse Cases as being one 
of the few federal privileges and immunities protected by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.210  The Court struck down a one-dollar fee on 
persons exiting Nevada in Crandall v. Nevada, finding the 
power to levy any tax on interstate travel to be inconsistent 
with federal sovereignty.211  In United States v. Guest, the 
Court upheld a civil rights indictment for interfering with the 
right to travel, calling the right “fundamental.”212  More 
recently, in the latter part of the twentieth century, the Court 
has struck down durational residency requirements for state 
public assistance benefits as violative of the right to interstate 
migration, grounding its analysis in heightened equal 
protection scrutiny213 and Fourteenth Amendment Privileges 
and Immunities.214  The right to travel encompasses a 
fundamental right to unfettered interstate travel, while the 
right to international travel is subject to reasonable 
restrictions.215  Although the Supreme Court has suggested in 
dicta that there is no fundamental right to intrastate travel, 
circuit courts remain split on the question.216 
Even assuming a ramping up of renewable energy 
technologies, a ban on fossil fuels will likely make long distance 
travel much more expensive or much less convenient.  
Although liquid biofuels are already proven substitutes for 
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fossil fuels for ground and air transportation,217 the planetary 
energy balance dictates that renewable liquid fuels can never 
be as plentiful—and therefore as cheap—as fossil fuels have 
been.218 
Accordingly, a ban on fossil fuels might be subject to a claim 
that the extreme increase in the cost of long distance travel 
constitutes an unconstitutional burden on the right to 
interstate travel.  Such a claim is plausible, but would be 
unlikely to succeed under current law.  In Williams v. Fears,219 
the Supreme Court declared that the “right of locomotion” was 
a liberty protected by the Due Process Clause in considering a 
challenge to a Georgia license tax on emigrant agents.  The 
Court found that the tax impacted the right to interstate travel 
only indirectly.220  Nevertheless, the Court has rejected claims 
that the right to drive a car is fundamental, upholding 
restrictions on qualifications for driver’s licenses and declining 
to require pre-deprivation process for license suspension or 
revocation.221 
Circuit courts have similarly rejected claims against 
regulations making air travel more expensive or less 
convenient.  Most memorably, the Ninth Circuit rejected a 
claim that the effect of air travel rate regulation was to make 
air travel unaffordable in violation of the constitutional right to 
travel.222  The Court declared that a “rich man can choose to 
drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk.  The poor 
man’s lack of choice in his mode of travel may be unfortunate, 
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but it is not unconstitutional.”223  The Fifth Circuit similarly 
rejected a challenge to air routing regulations that made air 
travel less convenient, declaring “the argument reduces to the 
feeble claim that passengers have a constitutional right to the 
most convenient form of travel.  That notion, as any 
experienced traveler can attest, finds no support 
whatsoever.”224 
These cases, however, provide an exception where the effect 
of the regulation burdening individual locomotion has the effect 
of completely cutting off available means of travel.225  A 
complete ban on fossil fuels might make transcontinental and 
intercontinental air travel prohibitively expensive for all but 
the wealthiest members of society, opening up such a ban to a 
claim that it effectively precludes such travel in violation of the 
constitutional right. 
While no court has characterized such an interest as a 
fundamental right subject to heightened scrutiny, two district 
court decisions in the Ninth Circuit have recognized that the 
expense and burdens of alternatives to air transport for 
international trips make the denial of the option of air travel 
the equivalent of a ban on international travel.  According to 
the Northern District of California: 
 
While the Constitution does not ordinarily guarantee the right to 
travel by any particular form of transportation, given that other 
forms of travel usually remain possible, the fact remains that for 
international travel, air transport in these modern times is 
practically the only form of transportation, travel by ship being 
prohibitively expensive.226 
 
These district courts addressed the Transportation Security 
Agency’s “No-Fly List” and determined that the excluded air 
passengers had a due process protected liberty interest which 
guaranteed the provision of adequate procedures for an 
individual to challenge their inclusion on the list.  These courts 
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did not declare that the right to international air travel was a 
fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny.  Indeed, Supreme 
Court precedent precludes a declaration that the right to 
international travel is a fundamental right.227 
c. Exceptions and Bypass Provisions 
There are few true absolutes in the law.  As Professor 
Zygmunt Plater has observed, the history of absolute 
prohibitions in environmental law has been a history of 
judicial, administrative, and legislative exceptions and 
bypasses.228  The best example of this process is the prohibition 
against any federal project that would threaten the continued 
existence of a species, contained in section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act.229  The absolute prohibition of section 7 ultimately 
gave way to the section 7(e) endangered species committee 
process for exempting federal activities deemed sufficiently 
important from the ban.230 
Other attempts at absolute bans have likewise drawn 
statutory or judicial exceptions.  The Thirteenth Amendment 
ban on involuntary servitude, for example, has been 
interpreted not to prohibit military conscription231 or prison 
labor.232  During prohibition, Congress legislated an exemption 
from the ban on the production or sale of alcohol for 
sacramental wine.233  It is hard to predict what exceptions and 
bypasses may arise under a ban on fossil fuel use; one can 
easily imagine an exception for national defense uses. 
C. Achieving a Fossil Fuel Ban Through Constitutional 
Amendment 
Professor Lazarus has suggested that the severity of 
economic adjustments to be wrought by effective mitigation of 
climate change may require some form of pre-commitment 
strategy to insulate greenhouse gas regulation from the 
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inevitable political backlash.234  One of the arguments of this 
Article in favor of a simple ban on the sale and use of fossil 
fuels is that it avoids the political and economic allocation 
issues that are inevitable in a system of taxation, marketable 
permits, or direct regulation.  An outright ban on fossil fuels 
would not require an independent agency to administer. 
However, a legislatively or administratively imposed ban on 
the sale or use of fossil fuels would still be subject to political 
backlash and legislative reversal.  It may be that the most 
efficacious means of protecting a ban on fossil fuels from 
legislative reversal would be a constitutional amendment 
banning fossil fuels.  Such an amendment would also resolve 
potential challenges to federal authority to implement a ban.  
While the likelihood of achieving the congressional resolution 
and ratification by three fourths of the States may seem 
fanciful in today’s political climate, the premise of this Article 
is that the coming climate disaster will eventually become 
sufficiently urgent that a political consensus in favor of a ban 
on fossil fuels will become possible, just as the political 
consensus in favor of strong action against water, land, and air 
pollution developed in the 1970s. 
As discussed in the next Part of this Article, there are 
historical examples of social change movements achieving the 
ultimate pre-commitment of constitutional amendment.  The 
ultimate success of the abolition movement in achieving the 
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment in the nineteenth 
century is one example.  Another example is the success of the 
temperance movement in achieving ratification of the 
Eighteenth Amendment in the early twentieth century.  The 
very different experiences with these two constitutional 
amendments may provide a useful frame to consider the 
prospects for successful implementation of a fossil fuel ban. 
V. MEETING THE SOCIAL-POLITICAL CHALLENGE OF A FOSSIL 
FUEL BAN:  THE NEW ABOLITIONISM MEETS THE OLD 
ABOLITIONISM 
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States to a 
level that is consistent with avoiding catastrophic global 
climate change will require fundamental changes in the U.S. 
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energy economy.235  Addressing climate change will also 
require fundamental changes to individual personal choices 
about where people live, work, play, and how they heat and 
cool their homes.236  While efficiency and renewable energy 
technologies may be able to carry us a long way towards 
achieving the necessary independence from fossil fuels, full 
achievement of this goal is inconsistent with current U.S. 
energy consumption patterns under which many Americans 
choose to live far from their jobs, drive to work in large single-
passenger vehicles, and fly long distances for recreational, 
social, and business reasons.237 
The working assumption among institutions, organizations, 
and scholars is that the radical economic and social change 
necessary to address global warming will be driven by law and 
legal institutions.238  Much ink has been spilled discussing the 
relative merits of a whole panoply of legal tools, ranging from 
economic controls such as emissions trading regimes and 
carbon taxes to traditional regulatory controls such as 
emissions limits, to the extension of common law doctrines of 
tort liability or public trust as a means of controlling 
greenhouse gas emissions.239  The premise of the first half of 
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this Article is that some sort of legal ban on fossil fuel use will 
eventually be necessary.  The working assumption behind 
these discussions is that—properly implemented—legal change 
is capable of prompting the sort of permanent social change 
that will be required to address climate change. 
This represents a tremendous national and global change in 
economic and social arrangements to be achieved in a matter of 
a few decades.  The magnitude and abbreviated timeframe for 
this necessary change would place it among such progressive 
national transformations as the elimination of slavery, school 
desegregation, gender and race equality, and prohibition.  If 
anything, the necessary time frame may be shorter than it took 
to achieve, or partially achieve, these other progressive goals.  
Under what circumstances can law reform achieve cultural 
reform on this scale? 
Law-driven social changes of this magnitude are not 
unprecedented, but seem relatively few.  Climate activists in 
the United States consciously draw on the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s in both their rhetoric and their tactics, 
hoping to repeat the relatively successful social change 
accomplished by 1960s civil rights legislation.240  However, the 
civil rights struggle is not the only paradigm for fundamental 
social and economic change driven by law.  Other examples of 
such fundamental change include abolition, prohibition, gender 
equality, school desegregation, and to a lesser extent, the 
twentieth century development of the administrative state, the 
New Deal, and the 1970s environmental law revolution.  At 
least one of these social change initiatives (prohibition) was an 
abject failure, another (abolition) was a complete success.  The 
others have had moderate—but incomplete—success at 
achieving the degree of social restructuring. 
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While climate activism has begun to take on the mantle of 
the “New Abolitionism,” climate activists and law reform 
advocates have yet to adopt the implication of this sobriquet—
that the proper response to human induced climate change is a 
total ban on the burning of fossil fuels.241  Rather, climate law 
reform advocates argue for putting a price on carbon, 
effectively converting the problem from one of moral and 
ethical responsibility for destruction of the planetary ecosystem 
to one of proper economic allocation of a limited resource.242  It 
is the premise of this Article that such a ban is the logical and 
rhetorically consistent response to human-induced climate 
change, and that the abolition movement of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries provides the most promising analogue for 
successful law-induced cultural reform.  Conversely, 
prohibition serves as a cautionary example of a failed law 
reform movement; the civil rights movement may be a flawed 
analogue.  In short, the climate movement (at least in the 
United States) consciously models itself on the civil rights 
movement, but bears some unfortunate similarities to the 
temperance movement of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and needs to become more like the globally 
successful movement for the abolition of slavery of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The mainstream U.S. environmental movement has yet to 
confront the distributive justice problem inherent in an 
allocation approach to a phaseout of carbon emissions.243  
Achievement of a global middle class with a U.S. middle class 
carbon footprint is utterly inconsistent with confining global 
emissions to the 565 gigatons remaining.  Yet a visit to the 
websites of the national environmental organizations does not 
reveal that any of these organizations are telling their 
members or the public at large to be abandoning their gas-
powered cars, moving out of their single-family houses, or even 
eschewing air travel, as if the nation and the world can achieve 
a carbon neutral energy future without all of these things 
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happening.244  Something has to give:  either the hugely 
disproportionate U.S. carbon footprint—even among the 
constituents of environmental organizations—or aspirations for 
a more equal global economic distribution. 
It is not surprising that U.S. environmental organizations, 
fearful of alienating their own membership, have chosen to 
avoid taking a position on the global allocation of the 565 
gigaton carbon increment or what that would mean for the 
price of gasoline, airline tickets, and the lifestyles of their 
members.  This organizational behavior is consistent with what 
some social scientists have described as the resource 
mobilization model of social movements, in which social 
movements act primarily to perpetuate themselves, much like 
business firms, and frame issues and grievances in ways that 
will not alienate their supporters.245 
Existing technologies do exist to replace most, but not all, the 
accoutrements of middle class life.246  However, these solutions 
cost more than their fossil-powered equivalents and have not 
been widely adopted—even among environmentalists.247  
Carbon pricing mechanisms hope to achieve conversion to 
renewables by driving up the price of carbon until renewable 
energy alternatives enjoy a price advantage.248  Thus, the 
unspoken premise behind carbon pricing strategies is to 
achieve carbon neutrality by making a fossil-powered lifestyle 
more expensive than its renewable alternative—not by making 
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alternative fuels less expensive (though some mitigation 
through economies of scale, subsidies, or technological 
innovation are hoped for).  While a zero carbon economy is 
technically feasible, it will require a huge reallocation of 
technology and an abandonment of investments in existing 
carbon-dependent infrastructure:  not just the fossil fuels that 
must remain in the ground,249 but the automobiles, power 
plants, planes, suburbs, houses, and highways that have been 
built in reliance on their continued availability.250  Some 
markers of middle class existence in the developed world—
large single family houses, single passenger cars, and cheap air 
travel—may simply be unavailable in a zero carbon energy 
economy. 
Nor is there any visible global movement towards achieving 
the necessary rate of carbon emissions.  Allocation approaches 
to limiting carbon emissions have failed to achieve the 
necessary reductions where implemented251 and have failed 
politically in the United States.  Based on current trends, 
limiting carbon emissions to 565 gigatons by mid-century 
would seem to require implementation of a zero carbon global 
energy economy by the year 2030, as the 565 gigaton increment 
will be fully used up by then.252 
A. Can Law Change Culture? 
The underlying premise of much of the climate change debate 
among legal scholars and economists is that as long as the 
governing system of laws generates the appropriate legislative, 
judicial, or regulatory set of rules, then the market and social 
economies will come into line, conform, internalize the rules, 
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and achieve the desired results.253  This breezy optimism about 
the power of law reform to effect social and economic change is 
not necessarily justified, as the three prime examples examined 
in this Article illustrate.  Law reform in these cases is just the 
beginning—a tentative beginning—of social reform of this 
magnitude. 
Prohibition may well be the starkest example of law reform 
that failed as social reform.254  But even the law reform 
movement most generally hailed as a success—the civil rights 
movement—is an incomplete success at best and has taken 
over a generation to internalize.  Just as Brown v. Board of 
Education255 did not immediately (or ultimately) integrate 
American public schools, the emancipation and equality 
promises of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments have 
taken generations to internalize. 
Indeed, some legal scholars have questioned the efficacy of 
legal change to accomplish progressive social change.  Professor 
Gerald Rosenberg argues that Brown did not prompt any of the 
modest improvements in race relations and social integration 
that followed from it:  “In terms of judicial effects, then, Brown 
and its progeny stand for the proposition that courts are 
impotent to produce significant social reform.”256  Professor 
Gerald Torres has similarly questioned whether law reform, 
controlled by elites, is sufficient to accomplish social reform.257  
Torres notes that the Brown decision, addressed to racial 
classifications in education rather than equality of resources, 
failed to achieve its promise of improved educational outcomes 
due to white flight, tracking, and provocation of class anxieties 
among the lower-income whites left in integrated school 
systems.258  Torres argues for an expanded understanding of 
the role of law in social change and inclusion of non-elites in 
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this understanding, what he and Professor Lani Gunier have 
dubbed “Demosprudence.”259  And Professor Thomas Stoddard 
has similarly noted the potential disconnect between law 
reform and social internalization of the reformed norms.260  
Stoddard commented on the disconnect he observed between 
the normative laws in New Zealand guaranteeing equal rights 
regardless of sexual preference and the complete invisibility of 
gays in New Zealand society.261  Stoddard thus points out the 
distinction between “rule shifting” and “culture shifting.”262  
Stoddard identifies four factors that must be present for rule 
changing to effect culture change:  “For ‘culture-shifting’ to 
take place, all four factors must be engaged.  The four factors 
are these:  (1) A change that is very broad or profound; (2) 
Public awareness of that change; (3) A general sense of the 
legitimacy (or validity) of the change; and (4) Overall, 
continuous enforcement of the change.”263 
These scholars recognize that legal change is just a part of 
remedial societal change.  As the failed example of prohibition 
and the incomplete success of the civil rights reforms illustrate, 
the relationship between law reform and the underlying social 
movement is key to the success of remedial laws.  Perhaps 
Richard Kluger, in his history of the desegregation effort, put it 
best: 
 
But law, in a democracy, cannot impose that resolution by the 
force of the state alone.  Democracy is too unruly for that.  That is 
its great weapon against the would-be tyrant; that is the agony it 
imposes on the most enlightened reformer.  Law in a democracy 
must contend with reality.  It has to persuade.  It has to induce 
compliance by its appeal to shared human values and social 
goals.  How well law succeeds in winning, however reluctantly, 
the abandonment of unjust private advantage is perhaps the 
severest, and best, measure of that society’s humanity.264 
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As Kluger points out, successful law reform “has to 
persuade.”265  It must have a social component as well as a 
political and legal component, thus the prospects for successful 
law reform cannot be considered without reference to the larger 
social movement of which that law reform is a part.  Social 
movements must convince a substantial portion of society of 
the justness of their cause, and they must motivate individuals 
to participate and identify with the movement.266  Issue 
framing plays an important role in this process, and social and 
legal reform movements depend heavily on identifying victims 
of injustice and the villains causing that injustice to recruit 
adherents to their cause.267  The nature of these victims and 
villains may have some bearing on the ultimate success of the 
reform movement. 
B. Climate Activism in the United States:  The Civil Rights 
Model 
While nearly all of the national environmental organizations 
in the United States have active climate advocacy programs, 
one organization, 350.org, has stepped forward as the leading 
social activist group organized specifically around the climate 
change issue.  350.org’s name refers to the number of parts per 
million of CO2 the global atmosphere must be reduced to in 
order to avoid catastrophic climate change.268  350.org has 
explicitly adopted the mantle of the civil rights activists of the 
1960s and the anti-apartheid South African divestment 
activists of the 1970s and 1980s.269  Like the civil rights 
movement, 350.org has deployed protest rallies and civil 
disobedience to publicize its cause.270  Its more recent 
campaigns have included a rally in Washington, D.C., 
culminating in a march on the White House to protest the 
anticipated approval of the Keystone XL shale oil pipeline.271  
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Many protestors at this rally were arrested after refusing 
orders to break up the unpermitted demonstration.272  Other 
acts of civil disobedience have included trespassing on 
mountaintop removal coal mine property in order to interfere 
with coal mining operations.273  350.org’s most recent 
campaign—”Fossil Free”—seeks to organize college students to 
hold sit-ins in university offices to demand disinvestment of 
endowments from fossil fuel industry investments.274  This 
campaign is explicitly modeled on campus divestment 
campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s as a protest against South 
Africa’s apartheid policy.275 
C. The Possible Climate Activism Analogues:  Law Driven 
Social Change Paradigms in the United States 
Climate activists thus seek to take on the mantle of the 
1960s civil rights activists and have adopted many of the civil 
rights activists’ tactics.  But the civil rights struggle of the 
1960s is not the only analog for achieving social change 
through activism for legal changes.  Nor is it necessarily the 
most apt analog.  Practically from its birth as a nation, the 
United States has spawned social activist movements, from the 
abolitionist and temperance movements of the early nineteenth 
century, through the prohibitionists and suffragists of the early 
twentieth century, to the civil rights movement of the mid-
twentieth century, and the environmental movement of the 
later twentieth century. 
These activist movements have leveraged political activism 
into legal change, which in turn implemented social and 
economic reordering of a scale similar to those necessary to 
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respond to climate change.  In each case, activists challenged 
existing social and economic arrangements and relationships, 
and in each case, defenders of the status quo made similar 
arguments about the impracticality and social disruptiveness 
of the changes demanded by the activists.  These movements 
have used various legal tools, ranging from legislative reform 
to litigation to constitutional amendment, in order to achieve 
their social and economic restructuring goals.  The rhetoric 
used by each of these social change movements echoes their 
predecessors.  The following discussion investigates and 
compares features of these social change efforts in order to 
provide context for the current activism for the social change 
necessary to address climate change. 
The civil rights movement has served as the prototype for 
every U.S. social movement since, and is the model consciously 
adopted by climate change activists in the United States.276  
Similarities and dissimilarities with this movement thus bear 
examination.  In addition, the temperance movement of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the abolition 
movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are 
comparable to the climate response movement in the scope of 
economic and social readjustment they seek and their reliance 
on law reform as their primary means of achieving this 
adjustment.277  The successes and failures of these movements, 
and the similarities and dissimilarities in their strategies and 
tactics, may have a bearing on the prospects for a successful 
law-mediated response to climate change. 
1. Civil Rights and Racial Equality Movement 
Since climate activists claim the mantle of the civil rights 
marchers of the 1960s, it is worth examining the similarities 
and differences between the climate movement and the civil 
rights movement first.  Climate stabilization and racial 
equality share some salient features—as with any social 
change movement, the activists are pitted against existing 
social and political institutions that seek to maintain existing 
hierarchies and economic, social, and political arrangements.  
 
276.  THEODORE O. WINDT, JR., PRESIDENTS AND PROTESTERS:  POLITICAL RHETORIC 
IN THE 1960S 163 (1990). 
277.  A comparison to other movements, such as women’s suffrage, the 1970s 
environmental movement, and marriage equality, may also be instructive. 
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Racial equality, like climate change, can be described as a 
“wicked” problem—a problem that defies easy solution because 
the problem’s nature cannot be fully defined without reference 
to the solutions contemplated.278 
Climate activists are also relying on the same legal tools as 
the civil rights activists of the twentieth century.  Just as 
judicial dismantling of school segregation was the holy grail of 
the NAACP when a legislative solution was politically 
impossible, some contemporary climate activists (e.g., Our 
Children’s Trust) are pressing litigation to invoke the public 
trust doctrine to achieve judicially mandated imposition of 
climate change solutions.279  Just as the civil rights activists of 
the 1960s pressed—successfully—for national legislation 
banning race discrimination in employment, education, and 
places of public accommodation, contemporary climate activists 
are pushing for comprehensive legislation limiting carbon 
emissions to sustainable levels.  And, of course, climate 
activists have adopted some of the social activism tools 
deployed by the civil right activists of the 1960s, including 
mass demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience. 
Yet, despite these positive parallels, there are some 
cautionary parallels and distinctions between the civil rights 
movement and the climate stabilization movement.  If the goal 
of climate stabilization is a zero carbon energy and 
transportation economy, then the civil rights movement may 
not be the best model.  The school desegregation decision and 
the 1960s civil rights legislation succeeded in eliminating de 
jure school segregation and much overt discrimination in 
employment and places of public accommodation.280  But half a 
century later, de facto school segregation persists, and social 
and economic racial inequality continues.281  If the goal of 
 
278.  Lazarus, supra note 80, at 1159. 
279.  2015 Federal Lawsuit, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, 
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/us/federal-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/8V7M-R68N] (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
280.  See Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Movement:  What a 
Historical Juxtaposition of the Legal Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism 
Has to Teach Environmentalists Today, 31 ENVTL. L. 229, 292 (2001) (describing the 
effects of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited segregation in public 
accommodations, prohibited discrimination in employment, and symbolized “that the 
nation as a whole would not tolerate such blatant, violent racism”). 
281.  See Sarah Childress, A Return to School Segregation in America?, PBS (July 2, 
2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-return-to-school-segregation-in-
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climate stabilization activists is the achievement of a zero 
carbon society within fifteen (or even fifty) years, then the civil 
rights movement is an example of failure rather than success. 
There is also some inconsonance between the civil rights 
demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience of the 1960s and 
those of contemporary climate activists.  Both use mass 
protests and acts of civil disobedience to draw public attention 
to their cause and demonstrate the depth of their own personal 
commitment to the cause,282 but the organizers and 
participants in the earliest civil rights demonstrations 
consisted largely of the African American victims of racial 
injustice in this country.  The civil rights movement can justly 
claim to have been a grievance-initiated rather than a resource 
mobilization-initiated movement.  To be sure, the civil rights 
movement ultimately recruited northern middle class whites to 
their cause,283 but this was only after the movement had 
already achieved some of its most significant legal and social 
victories, including Brown and the Montgomery bus boycott.  
Climate activists have adopted the slogan “climate justice” in 
support of their cause in recognition of the differential impacts 
climate change will have on developing nations and 
communities of color.284  But the victims of climate injustice are 
by and large missing from the climate activists’ 
demonstrations.  These victims tend to be geographically and 
temporally remote from the U.S. climate activism community.  
The People’s Climate March in New York City in September 
2014 set aside over twenty-five city blocks for the staging of the 
marchers, with barely four blocks set aside for the marchers 
representing climate victim communities.285  If anything, the 
 
america/ [https://perma.cc/Z4CY-CB8R] (“By 2011, the percentage of black students in 
majority white schools was 23.2 percent—slightly lower than it was in 1968.”); Jolie 
Lee, Still Apart:  Map Shows States with Most-Segregated Schools, USA TODAY (May 
15, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/05/15/school-
segregation-civil-rights-project/9115823/ [https://perma.cc/3JSQ-E3XK] (citing racial 
discrimination, movement of affluent families, and housing discrimination as factors 
that contribute to continued segregation in schools). 
282.  Marilyn Sewell, Civil Disobedience and Climate Change, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marilyn-sewell/civic-disobedience-and-
cl_b_ 7935984.html [https://perma.cc/M56E-78GK]. 
283.  DOUG MCADAM, FREEDOM SUMMER 37 (1988). 
284.  Climate Justice, 350.ORG, http://350.org/category/topic/justice/ 
[https://perma.cc/HKN3-5BFG] (last visited May 15, 2016). 
285.  The People’s Climate March Lineup, PEOPLE’S CLIMATE MARCH, 
http://2014.peoplesclimate.org/lineup/ [https://perma.cc/WA6H-GKGS] (last visited Apr. 
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marchers and protesters, consisting of those Americans who 
can afford to fly to Washington, D.C. and New York City, are 
more likely to be on the “giving” end of climate injustice than 
on the receiving end.  There is no small irony in the fact that 
simply by flying to one of these protests and returning home, 
many of the protesters have greatly exceeded that one-ton 
annual per capita direct carbon footprint the world needs to 
achieve.  This lack of true climate victims among the marchers 
not only makes for poor television, it dilutes the power of the 
message compared to the civil rights marches of the 1960s. 
The civil rights movement included clear victims and villains.  
African Americans were being beaten, murdered, and arrested 
simply for seeking to exercise the basic rights and enjoy the 
basic equalities that are drawn into the nation’s founding 
documents.286  The villains were the Southern police chiefs 
siccing attack dogs on peaceful protestors, the lynch mobs 
attacking the freedom riders, and the government officials who 
refused to register eligible African Americans to vote.287  Not 
only does the climate movement lack such clear individual 
victims, it also lacks clear individual villains as well.  Climate 
activists have focused their attention on the fossil fuel industry 
and cast that industry as the villain.288  This may be useful 
framing for recruitment and motivation of its members, but it 
lacks the visceral appeal of individual cruelty and violence 
directed at the civil rights activists.  And the climate activists’ 
choice to cast the fossil fuel industry as its villain suffers 
ultimately from a problem of misdirection:  it is not the 
extraction and distribution of fossil fuels that is the primary 
cause of climate change, it is the burning of those fuels.  And 
the people who burn those fuels are for the largest part the 
 
3, 2016); see Ari Phillips, More than 310,000 People Descend on New York to March for 
Climate Action, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 21, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
climate/2014/09/21/ 3570150/peoples-climate-march/ [https://perma.cc/2PSP-KMJF]. 
286.  Simone Sebastian, Don’t Criticize Black Lives Matter for Provoking Violence.  
The Civil Rights Movement Did, Too, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/ posteverything/wp/2015/10/01/dont-criticize-black-
lives-matter-for-provoking-violence-the-civil-rights-movement-did-too/ 
[https://perma.cc/4CKU-XMYM]. 
287.  See SARA BULLARD, FREE AT LAST:  A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT AND THOSE WHO DIED IN THE STRUGGLE (1989). 
288.  Mike Gold, Climate Change Super Villains, RIVERDALE PRESS (Dec. 31, 2014), 
http://riverdalepress.com/stories/Climate-change-super-villains,56073. 
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very supporters of the climate justice movement, middle-class 
Americans. 
One can understand the movement’s choice not to cast its 
own supporters as villains, but at some point issue framing 
must confront issue reality, and full implementation of a 
climate response will require social change even among the 
liberal middle-class supporters of the climate movement, not 
just on the part of Exxon Mobil.  It is telling that the 
Montgomery bus boycott required every African American in 
Montgomery, Alabama to give up their usual mode of 
commuting to work and to ride-share (and in many cases walk) 
to work for an entire year.289  That the climate movement has 
not yet asked such a sacrifice from its adherents indicates a 
certain failure, to date, to internalize the true goals of the 
movement and to identify the true cause of the climate 
grievances. 
The climate activists’ acts of civil disobedience also lack some 
of the rhetorical force of those of the 1960s civil rights activists.  
Pure civil disobedience involves a public violation of an unjust 
law as a means of demonstrating the injustice of the law as 
well as publicizing the injustice.290  When Rosa Parks refused 
to surrender her bus seat to a white passenger, she was 
arrested for violating the very segregation laws that she was 
seeking to overturn.291  Similarly, the sit-ins at segregated 
lunch counters were a protest against the use of trespass laws 
to deprive African Americans of equal treatment at private 
establishments open to the public.292  When a climate protester 
is arrested for failing to disperse at an unpermitted 
demonstration, it is not the laws regulating public 
demonstrations that the activist is opposed to.  The arrests still 
help call attention to the activists’ cause—particularly when 
the arrestees include leaders of the climate activism 
community like James Hansen, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. (and his 
 
289.  Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott, U.S. HIST., 
http://www.ushistory.org/ us/54b.asp [https://perma.cc/GAL2-UP93] (last visited May 
16, 2016). 
290.  Civil Disobedience, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/civil%20disobedience (last visited May 16, 2016). 
291.  Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott, supra note 289. 
292.  Freedom Struggle, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM AM. HIST., 
http://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/6-legacy/freedom-struggle-2.html 
[https://perma.cc/M4WR-S6ES] (last visited May 16, 2016). 
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son Conor), veteran civil rights leader Julian Bond, and the 
President of the Sierra Club.293  But these acts of civil 
disobedience lack the moral persuasion of an arrest for 
violating a law that is itself patently unjust. 
Climate activism consciously invokes the civil rights protests 
of the 1960s.  To be sure, there are parallels.  But there are 
also significant differences, which may make reliance on the 
civil rights model of activism and legal change imperfectly 
effective both politically and legally. 
2. Prohibition 
Many aspects of the climate stabilization battle call to mind 
another, less flattering analogue—that of prohibition.  
Prohibition should serve as a cautionary tale for the climate 
response movement.  As an unsuccessful example of law-
mediated social change, climate law reformers should pay close 
attention to the spectacular failure of prohibition.  Yet there 
are uncanny parallels between the temperance movement and 
the current incarnation of climate activists in the United 
States.  These parallels include the casting of a powerful 
consumer industry as the villain in the conflict, an evolution in 
goals from moderation to an outright ban, similar political and 
social mobilizing tactics, reliance on a precommitment strategy, 
anti-libertarianism of the movement’s goals, the assault on a 
consumer product in widespread use, the failure of many in the 
movement to internalize the change sought by the movement, 
and ultimately, the moralism underlying the movement. 
a. Casting Industry as Villains 
As noted above, the climate movement has chosen to cast the 
fossil fuel industry, and its prominent individual titans, as the 
villains in the conflict.294  The temperance movement similarly 
 
293.  See Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. Arrested:  Waterkeeper President Joins Others in 
Climate Change Rally Outside White House, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/13/robert-f-kennedy-jr-
arrested_n_2679609.html [https://perma.cc/H985-YGV5]; Top NASA Scientist Arrested 
(Again) in White House Protest, FOX NEWS (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.foxnews.com/science/2013/02/13/top-nasa-climate-scientist-arrested-again-
in-white-house-protest.html [https://perma.cc/WUM4-ACM6]. 
294.  Gold, supra note 288. 
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cast the brewing and saloon industry as its villains.295  In both 
cases, a consumer industry is cast as greedy and corrupt, 
acting without heed to the damage and destruction its practices 
are causing.  In both cases, the industry is accused (with some 
justice) of having subverted the democratic political system. 
The rhetorical parallels are at times uncanny.  Norman 
Clark, a historian sympathetic to the temperance movement, 
described the movement’s characterization of the liquor 
industry in the following terms: 
 
At every level of municipal or state responsibility, the liquor 
interests polluted politics . . . .  They repeatedly financed 
campaigns in opposition to women’s suffrage, and they did their 
best—and performed at their worst—in perverting democratic 
practice in the many state and local referenda on the question of 
licensing saloons.296 
 
Temperance advocate Reverend Mark Matthews similarly 
(and contemporaneously) described the liquor industry as  
the most fiendish, corrupt, and hell-soaked institution that 
ever crawled out of the slime of the eternal pit. . . .  [Congress] 
has been dominated by the liquor interests for the last forty-
two years, and the two great political parties are rum-soaked, 
saloon cursed, and without conscience on the abolition of this 
great enemy.297 
Current day descriptions of the fossil fuel industry echo these 
characterizations.  Bill McKibben echoes the eighteenth 
century temperance advocates in his description of the fossil 
fuel industry: 
 
These companies are a rogue force.  They are outlaws.  They are 
not outlaws against the law of the state, they get to write those 
for the most part.  But they are outlaws against the laws of 
physics.  If they carry out their business plan, the planet 
tanks . . . .  The thing that is holding us back above all else is the 
 
295.  Roots of Prohibition, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/prohibition/roots-of-
prohibition/ [https://perma.cc/JE9B-QCSP] (last visited May 16, 2016). 
296.  NORMAN H. CLARK, DELIVER US FROM EVIL:  AN INTERPRETATION OF 
AMERICAN PROHIBITION 4–5 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1976). 
297.  DALE E. SODEN, THE REVEREND MARK MATTHEWS:  AN ACTIVIST IN THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA 94–95 (U. of Wash. Press, 2001). 
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simple fact that the fossil fuel industry cheats.  Alone among 
industries they are allowed to pour out their wastes for free.298 
 
Activist Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. describes the industry in 
similar terms of political corruption:   
 
“They have so rigged the system that we cannot go to court.  The 
oil industry has turned Congress into indentured servants.  Even 
Obama in his State of the Union has to doff his cap to big oil and 
genuflect to them.”299   
 
These parallel vilifications of industry are important because 
in both cases, the movement chooses to identify the industry 
purveyors of a product as the source of the externalities 
associated with its use by the consumer.  Put simply, brewing 
beer and distilling liquor does not destroy families any more 
than pumping oil out of the ground causes climate change.  In 
both cases, the externalities that social change movements seek 
to address are caused by the consumption, not the production, 
of the product in question.  But from a resource mobilization 
and framing perspective, vilifying the industry that provides 
the offensive product is more effective, at least in the short 
term. 
In addition to casting the industry itself as the villain, both 
movements have identified industry leaders for particular 
demonization.  In the case of the temperance movement, the 
individual villains were the patriarchs of German-American 
brewing families, including Adolphus Busch.  Indeed, anti-
German sentiment during World War I has been identified as a 
factor giving national prohibition the political boost it needed 
to become a constitutional amendment.300  In the modern day 
case of climate activists, the individual villains are the Koch 
brothers, oil industry magnates whose anti-environmental 
 
298.  See 350.org, Do the Math—The Movie, YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KuCGVwJIRd0 (quoting Bill McKibben at 
00:14:20). 
299.  Interview with Robert F. Kennedy Jr., ABC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=7400698&page=1 [https://perma.cc/DA6H-
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300.  See Thomas Welskopp, Prohibition in the United States:  The German-
American Experience, 1919–1933, 53 BULL. GHI 31, 32 (2013), http://www.ghi-
dc.org/files/publications/bulletin/ 
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political donations and support for climate-denier foundations 
have earned them the special scorn of the climate movement.301 
b. Evolution from Moderation to Prohibition, and from 
State-Level Response to Federal 
As its name implies, the temperance movement started out 
as a movement seeking moderation, not complete abstinence, in 
the consumption of alcoholic beverages.  It was only after 
moderation-directed “temperance” efforts failed to effect 
meaningful changes in behavior did the movement adopt 
prohibition as its goal.302  Climate activism is in the process of 
undergoing a similar conversion, turning from advocacy of 
market based and rationing-style controls on fossil fuels, as 
advocated by mainstream environmental organizations, to the 
unstated goal of abolition of fossil fuels implicit in Bill 
McKibben’s argument that fossil fuel reserves beyond the 565 
gigaton increment be left in the ground.303  Although 350.org 
currently advocates simply for divestment from fossil fuel 
industry investments rather than a ban on fossil fuels, 
commentators have begun to recognize that McKibben’s 
argument is an implicit call for fossil fuel abolition.304 
There is also a parallel evolution from state-level to federal-
level responses.  Thwarted politically at the federal level, 
temperance advocates succeeded in turning many states dry.  
With the failure of the 2009 Climate Bill,305 climate advocates 
have had more success at the state level with the 
implementation of regional state greenhouse gas emissions 
trading programs, such as the Northeast’s Regional Greenhous 
Gas Initiative as well as California’s adoption of comprehensive 
legislation seeking to achieve a fifteen percent reduction in 
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state-wide carbon emissions by 2020.306  Temperance advocates 
turned their attention back to the national stage when the 
Supreme Court held that state bans on importation of alcohol 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.307  Ironically, some 
aspects of California’s renewable energy plan, as well as the 
renewable energy requirements in some of the regional 
greenhouse gas control alliances, have now been challenged on 
the grounds they violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.308 
c. Political Tactics 
Although climate activists’ tactics may seem to be inspired by 
the civil rights movement, those tactics themselves echoed 
many of the tactics adopted to great success by the temperance 
and suffrage movements of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  Long before the 1963 Civil Rights March 
on Washington, D.C., there was the 1913 Temperance March 
on Washington, D.C.309  The temperance movement had its 
political arms, including the National Prohibition Party as well 
as strategic candidate endorsements and lobbying efforts.310 
The temperance movement also had its moments of direct-
action civil disobedience.  The Women’s Anti-Saloon League 
blockaded saloons that were operating legally, while Carrie 
Nation later made a career of “hatchetizing” saloons operating 
illegally in violation of state anti-saloon laws.311  These acts of 
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civil disobedience have echoes in the modern day climate 
activists chaining themselves to the White House fence to 
protest the Keystone XL Pipeline and to more direct action 
activists who chain themselves to mountaintop removal coal 
mining equipment.312 
Beyond these more common forms of public advocacy, the 
climate movement echoes the temperance movement in its use 
of science and public education as well.  Temperance advocates 
relied on a developing scientific consensus that alcohol was an 
addictive drug with no medicinal properties,313 just as climate 
activists rely on the global scientific consensus that 
anthropogenic carbon emissions will cause a catastrophic 
change in the global climate.  Temperance advocates succeeded 
in incorporating anti-alcohol education in the public school 
curriculum,314 just as today’s climate activists struggle to 
ensure that public schools teach the scientific consensus 
concerning anthropogenic climate change.315 
d. Pre-Commitment Strategy 
Anticipating political resistance in implementation, the 
temperance movement adopted the ultimate pre-commitment 
strategy:  a constitutional amendment prohibiting the sale or 
use of intoxicating liquor.316  The solution to climate change 
may well require some super-legislative legal change to 
implement, such as a constitutional amendment or 
international treaty.317  Climate legislation can be undone as 
soon as the painful social adjustments begin to kick in, just like 
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early attempts at prohibition accomplished at the legislative 
level were soon undone.  Prohibition was ultimately imposed 
through constitutional amendment. 
e. Anti-Libertarianism 
Both prohibition of alcoholic beverages and a probable 
prohibition on the burning of fossil fuels are anti-libertarian; 
that is, they both profoundly limit freedom of individual action 
in modern society.  Prohibition limits the freedom to choose to 
imbibe intoxicating liquors, a ban on fossil fuels would limit the 
unfettered freedom of movement and of travel that is made 
possible by cheap energy in the form of fossil fuels.  Both 
activities have come to have profound significance for self-
definition and autonomy—and alcohol had done so by the time 
that prohibition was adopted. 
The parallels between intoxication and fossil fuels may run 
deeper than is first apparent, especially when one considers 
that the American car culture in its current form is almost 
entirely dependent on cheap and freely available fossil fuels.  
Alcohol’s attraction has always included its ability to induce 
feelings of power, invulnerability, and control318—exactly the 
same feelings induced by driving an automobile.319  “Being in 
the driver’s seat” is more than a metaphor; it is a statement of 
cultural values, and one that is not satisfied by public 
transportation or car pools.  A century of advertising has 
infused American individuality, self-definition, class 
identification, and personal autonomy with one’s choice of 
automobile.320  Western culture may not give this autonomy up 
any more easily than it was willing to give up the feelings of 
power and control, however illusory, that come with alcohol. 
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[https://perma.cc/K8QN-5BAX] (“[T]he car and driving have always referenced the 
American experience of and desire for freedom, individualism, self-realization, 
prosperity, and progress.”). 
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Of course, libertarian ideals recognize that personal liberty 
must have a limit when personal choices cause harm to other 
people.321  The externalities of fossil fuel consumption 
undoubtedly justify restrictions on their use in the classic 
libertarian sense—but they may not in the American cultural 
tradition of libertarianism.  Alcohol also had—and continues to 
have—its externalities.  Temperance advocates sought to 
address the very real externalities of liquor consumption in the 
form of destroyed lives and working class families deprived of 
their needed income.  Alcohol continues to kill 88,000 
Americans each year.322  Even if climate change causes 
Hurricane Katrina-scale events to be an annual occurrence 
starting in 2050 (and no climate scientist is making such a 
prediction), a hundred times more Americans will die from the 
effects of alcohol consumption than will be killed by climate 
change through 2100 (this does not consider, of course, 
geographically remote populations that are more likely to 
suffer the most severe impacts of climate change).323  The 
judgment that one externality justifies autonomy limits while 
the other does not reflects an implicit value judgment about the 
worth of the autonomy interest at stake compared to the 
externalities involved. 
Although some defenders of segregation couched their 
arguments in terms of individual liberty and freedom of 
association,324 the civil rights movement did not seek to limit 
freedom of individual private action in nearly so fundamental a 
way. 
 
321.  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 144–45 (Harvard Press, 1863). 
322.  CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ALCOHOL USE AND YOUR HEALTH, 
http://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/pdfs/alcoholyourhealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUW9-5V9M] 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2016). 
323.  IFAD & THE GLOBAL MECHANISM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE 
ASIA/PACIFIC REGION 1 (2009), http://www.ifad.org/events/apr09/impact/pacific.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7XD6-TJHS]; J. Maarten Troost, Kiribati Faces Its Future, and a 
Rising Ocean, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2013/nov/13/opinion/la-oe-troost-climate-change-kiribati-20131113 
[https://perma.cc/4SQ8-ZYL4]; Jane Addison, Impact of Climate Change on Health and 
Wellbeing in Remote Australian Communities:  A Review of Literature and Scoping of 
Adaptation Options 10 (Coop. Research Ctr. for Remote Econ. Participation, Working 
Paper No. CW014, 2013), http://www.crc-rep.com.au/resource/CW014_ 
ImpactClimateChangeHealthWellbeing.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GSS-KE4R]. 
324.  See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959). 
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f. Assault on a Ubiquitous Consumer Product 
Implicit in the previous discussion of autonomy and liberty 
interests, both the temperance movement and the climate 
movement attack the use of a consumer product in widespread 
use throughout society.  This was not the case in the civil 
rights movement. 
g. Failure to Internalize the Social Change Goals 
There is an inherent contradiction between the climate 
movement’s implicit goal to ban fossil fuel consumption and its 
organization of rallies and marches that depend on fossil fuel 
consumption to bring its adherents together.  The temperance 
movement shared this contradiction—albeit to a much lesser 
extent—as many of its adherents were drinkers.  To be sure, 
the temperance movement included a large proportion of 
moralistic teetotalers, but some supporters of prohibition were 
themselves drinkers.  As historian Norman H. Clark wrote of 
the author Jack London: 
 
Yet Jack London, like many other drinkers of heroic capacities, 
poured himself still another glass while musing over his 
dedicated support of Prohibition.  He did not find his support 
either awkward or dishonest.325 
 
American climate activists similarly see nothing dishonest or 
awkward about burning fossil fuels at an unsustainable rate in 
order to maintain their lifestyle and carry out their protest 
activities.326  Some, like alcoholic prohibitionists seeking 
government help to cure their own alcoholism, may consciously 
be seeking government regulation to limit their own ability to 
make choices that, collectively, are destructive to the global 
ecosystem.  Others, like those upper-class prohibitionists who 
supported prohibition as a means to avoid the socially 
destructive effects of alcohol on the working class but had every 
intention on maintaining their own personal wine cellars, may 
believe that effective climate change regulation will not limit 
their own lifestyle choices.  Indeed, the language of the 
 
325.  CLARK, supra note 296, at 1. 
326.  Bill McKibben, A Moral Atmosphere, ORION MAG. (Mar. 28, 2013), 
https://orionmagazine.org/article/a-moral-atmosphere/ [https://perma.cc/4VL6-4CQ8]. 
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Eighteenth Amendment’s prohibition of “intoxicating 
beverages” left some ambiguity about whether that term would 
be applied to beer and wine as well as distilled liquors.327  Some 
supporters of prohibition may, indeed, have been surprised to 
learn that it limited their own glass of wine with dinner. 
Regardless, the failure of the climate movement to date to 
internalize its own message about the immorality of burning 
fossil fuels and the absolute necessity to end the practice 
should be a warning sign for successful cultural 
implementation of a legal response to climate change.  Unlike 
the temperance movement, there is no mainstream climate 
advocate who has completely foresworn the use of fossil 
fuels.328  If the temperance movement was unable to gain 
cultural acceptance of prohibition despite the positive example 
of legions of teetotalers, there is little reason to expect climate 
activists to gain cultural acceptance for a ban on fossil fuels. 
h. Moral Underpinnings of the Movement 
Sociologist Joseph Grusfield’s study of the temperance 
movement characterized the movement as a values and status-
oriented movement rather than a grievance-prompted 
movement.329  That is, temperance advocates consisted of 
middle-class Protestants who saw their status and Victorian 
family values as threatened by the urban immigrant labor who 
frequented the saloons.330  These white, middle-class 
Protestants saw hard work, devotion to family, and sobriety as 
moral imperatives and reacted to the waning social 
commitment to abstinence from alcohol as a marker of 
status.331  Thus, prohibition was an attempt to use the legal 
and political process to impose one set of lifestyle and family 
values on the larger population and thus contained the seeds of 
its own failure.332 
 
327.  CLARK, supra note 296, at 9. 
328.  Sociologist Clare Saunders, Environmental Networks and Social Movement 
Theory, has identified some countercultural environmental communities in London 
that foreswear use of automobiles.  See generally CLARE SAUNDERS, ENVIRONMENTAL 
NETWORKS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY (2013). 
329.  See GUSFIELD, supra note 302. 
330 Id. at 98–100, 105–06, 124. 
331 Id. at 125–26. 
332 Id. at 110, 111–38. 
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As suggested above, the lack of true climate victims among 
the leadership (and by and large even the membership) of the 
climate activist movement may render it susceptible to a 
similar characterization as a values-oriented movement rather 
than a grievance-oriented movement.333  Indeed, the climate 
policy debate in the United States has become inextricably 
intertwined with the so-called “culture wars” between the right 
and the left. 
One need not credit the climate-denier’s claim that climate 
science is an elaborate hoax dreamed up by a liberal cabal in 
order to impose its communitarian vision on the rest of society 
to inquire into the extent to which the framing of the climate 
issue by activist organizations reflects its own sense of cultural 
values.  Certainly, environmentalism in general, and climate 
activism in particular, reflect a set of moral and cultural values 
that cannot be defended on pure utilitarian grounds alone, 
such as the value of leaving natural habitats (including the 
global climate ecosystem) undisturbed, or the value of 
preserving the current ecosystem balance for future 
generations.  Climate activism runs some risk of becoming a 
values-oriented movement (and perhaps suffering the same 
fate as prohibition) to the extent that it strays from the pure 
scientific equivalence of carbon emissions.  Look at the 
websites of any of the mainstream environmental organizations 
and you will see exhortations to take public transportation to 
work, buy more fuel efficient cars, and increase the efficiency of 
home heating and cooling, but none of them will tell you to 
avoid discretionary air travel,334 even though personal air 
 
333.  Many sociologists disagree that there are any truly grievance-oriented social 
movements, and see the twentieth century rise of social movements in Western 
democracies as a reflection of the increased leisure and resources available to a middle 
class that is not generally among the aggrieved members of society.  See generally 
BUECHLER, supra note 245.   
334.  See Kristin Eberhard, What You Can Do to Reduce Your Carbon Footprint, 
SWITCHBOARD (Apr. 29, 2013), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/kgrenfell/ 
what_you_can_do_to_reduce_your.html [https://perma.cc/F6EL-LFSM]; Bob Schildgen, 
Hey Mr. Green, What Should My Carbon-Footprint Goal Be?, SIERRA MAG. (June 10, 
2015), http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/2015-4-july-august/green-life/hey-mr-green-
what-should-my-carbon-footprint-goal-be [https://perma.cc/5C9J-GBA5] (suggesting 
that we offset air travel rather than reduce air travel, and not suggesting offsets 
instead of other reductions); Komal Singh, 10 Simple Things to Reduce Your Carbon 
Footprint This 2014, GREENPEACE COMMUNITY BLOGS (Dec. 22, 2013), 
http://www.greenpeace.org/india/en/Blog/Community_blogs1/10-simple-things-to-do-to-
reduce-your-carbon-/blog/47775/ [https://perma.cc/Q8QA-K28Y]. 
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travel is likely by far the largest single component of the 
individual carbon footprint of most upper middle-class 
Americans who form the basic constituency of the 
environmental movement.335 
To the extent that this particular framing of the climate issue 
reflects underlying cultural values—large cars are bad and 
unnecessary, while air travel is a form of personal and cultural 
enrichment and is a good thing, despite equal carbon impacts—
the climate movement runs some risk, ultimately, of suffering 
the same fate as prohibition. 
These factors, unfortunately, seem to place the climate 
movement, at least in its current form, closer to the 
temperance movement in terms of its tactics, framing, and 
socio-political basis.  This leads to the question whether there 
are other legal reform social movements that might provide a 
more positive example for the climate movement.  A relatively 
hopeful analogy may be present in the abolitionist movement 
originating in the United Kingdom in the eighteenth century, 
and ultimately spreading to the United States and the rest of 
the globe. 
3. Abolition 
If the scientific determination that 565 gigatons of carbon 
dioxide emissions between now and 2050 is an absolute limit to 
keep climate change to tolerable levels, then something like an 
effective, absolute, and fully enforced prohibition on burning 
fossil fuels would be necessary.  Prohibition was neither 
effective in eliminating alcohol consumption in the United 
States nor was it effective in maintaining sufficient political 
support to persist.  As noted, the civil rights movement has 
fallen far short of achieving full integration and racial equality 
in the United States, despite its great legislative and litigation 
achievements.  As the health of the global ecosystem depends 
on a completely successful political and legal implementation of 
controls on fossil fuels, we must search for an example of law-
driven social change that was completely successful in 
achieving its goal.  The only U.S. example that comes to mind 
is abolition.  Unlike the temporary and partial success of 
 
335.  See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Your Biggest Carbon Sin May Be Air Travel, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/sunday-review/the-
biggest-carbon-sin-air-travel.html [https://perma.cc/X23S-3SCU]. 
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prohibition and the unfinished successes of the civil rights 
movement, slavery has been (all but) completely and 
permanently abolished in the United States.  And, as the 
response to climate change must be, the abolition of slavery—
more properly termed emancipation—was an international 
effort.  Indeed, examination of abolition as a social movement 
must necessarily focus on the British abolition efforts of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Great Britain was the 
leader in abolition, both socially and legally.336 
There is growing recognition in the public press of the 
parallels to be drawn between ending our reliance on fossil 
fuels and ending the world’s economic reliance on slave labor 
until the mid-nineteenth century.  Commentators such as 
George Monbiot337 and Christopher Hayes338 have noted the 
fact that the Industrial Revolution directly substituted fossil 
fuels for the work done largely by human slave labor prior to 
the invention of the steam engine.  By comparing climate 
activism to the abolition of slavery, I by no means wish to draw 
a moral equivalence between slavery and the burning of fossil 
fuels.  They are simply not moral equivalents.  But there may 
be some moral parallels between enjoying the fruits of slave 
labor (without being a slaveholder) and enjoying the benefits of 
a fossil fueled economy without regard to the human 
consequences of that energy economy.  And a slave economy’s 
reliance on practically costless human labor (with abject 
disregard for its human consequences) has obvious parallels to 
the Industrial Revolution and the substitution of fossil fuel 
powered machinery for human labor, with a similar disregard 
for the ultimate consequences to the global ecosystem.  Climate 
scientist and activist James Hansen has himself called the 
climate crisis a moral issue on a par with slavery.339 
There are several important structural, organizational, and 
rhetorical parallels between the historical international 
abolition project and the fossil fuel elimination project that 
 
336.  See John Oldfield, British Anti-Slavery, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
history/british/empire_seapower/antislavery_01.shtml [https://perma.cc/SDY6-JFUH] 
(last updated Feb. 17, 2011).   
337.  MONBIOT, supra note 12, at 61. 
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make emancipation an instructive analogy for successful law-
mediated social change.  These include the widespread cultural 
acceptance of the practice challenged, the economic nature of 
the practice challenged, the relation of abolition to 
international mercantilism, the global nature of the abolition 
effort, the evolution of the abolitionism from abolition to 
emancipation, rhetorical similarities in challengers and 
defenders of the institution challenged, and the parallel legal 
and social organizing efforts that may be the true antecedents 
of the 1960s civil rights movement. 
a. Cultural Acceptance of Slavery and Fossil Fuels 
Until the abolition movements of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, slavery was an accepted cultural norm 
throughout the world, across nations and cultures.  It was not 
until the colonial era that Northern Europe became a small 
enclave of non-slavery, even while slavery was tolerated in 
European colonies.340  Similarly, fossil fuel consumption has 
been a culturally accepted basis for economic activity since the 
burning of coal commenced in the 1700s.341 
As Christopher Hayes and others have noted, fossil fuels 
literally power the global economy, as slaves did in pre-
industrial times.342  Like slaves, fossil fuel reserves have been 
capitalized and form a significant portion of global wealth.343 
b. Relation to Mercantilism and Need for International 
Solution 
Eighteenth century slavery became the workforce for tropical 
sugar plantations, and the institution came to be justified on 
the asserted grounds that only coerced (and African) labor was 
capable of production in the harsh tropical climates suitable for 
sugar cane production.344  Although free labor advocates—
including Adam Smith—argued that free labor must 
 
340.  Slavery in History, FREE SLAVES, http://www.freetheslaves.net/about-
slavery/slavery-in-history/ [https://perma.cc/FC9C-S7UT] (last visited May 29, 2016).  
341.  A Brief History of Coal Use, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/ education/energylessons/coal/coal_history.html 
[https://perma.cc/S5QT-JPT4] (last updated Feb. 12, 2013). 
342.  Hayes, supra note 150. 
343.  See id. 
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80–81 (2009). 
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necessarily be more efficient than slaves, the U.K. found that 
its free colonies could not compete with slave colonies.345  Thus, 
emancipation—like reliance on renewable energy today—is 
seen as putting mercantilist economies at a competitive 
disadvantage in world markets.  The elimination of slavery 
thus became an international project, and as the U.K. moved 
towards emancipation, first by banning the slave trade, 
internationalization of the ban became a key part of British 
foreign policy.  Indeed, the British treaty with Spain in 1817 
included provisions allowing the U.K. to board Spanish flagged 
vessels to ensure they were not slave trading and established 
the first supranational claims tribunals to address claims of 
improper seizures.346 
A response to climate change will similarly demand an 
international response, obviously not just for the mercantilist 
reasons that drove the internationalization of abolition, but for 
the global nature of the ecological challenge.  No mitigation of 
climate change is possible without cooperation of all of the 
world’s developed, industrialized nations. 
c. Evolution from Abolition to Emancipation 
Just as the temperance movement evolved from seeking 
moderation to seeking prohibition in alcohol consumption, and 
just as the climate movement must evolve from seeking 
moderation in fossil fuel consumption to an absolute ban, the 
abolition movement evolved from seeking a ban on the slave 
trade to seeking emancipation and termination of the 
institution of slavery.  The British abolition movement started 
as a movement for the abolition of the African slave trade.  
Wilberforce’s entreaties to Parliament were careful to 
distinguish “abolition”—which was limited to abolition of the 
slave trade—from emancipation.347  The latter was considered 
too radical, and too threatening to Britain’s colonial planter 
class, who feared retribution by freed slaves.348  The climate 
movement has similarly started with relatively modest goals—
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348.  Id. at 24–29. 
300 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW Vol. 41:2 
disinvestment or carbon pricing—but must eventually adopt 
complete cessation of fossil fuel consumption. 
d. Rhetorical Parallels in the Climate and Slavery Debates 
The public debates about abolition of slavery and abolition of 
fossil fuels are carried out in remarkably similar terms.  For 
the abolitionist’s part, both slavery abolitionists and fossil fuel 
abolitionists argue that the challenged institution is in fact 
economically inefficient.  As noted, free labor advocates argued 
that free labor must necessarily be more efficient than coerced 
labor.349  This argument is echoed by modern day climate 
advocates who argue that renewable energy would be cheaper 
than fossil fuels if fossil fuels were denied the government 
subsidies implicit in national defense, extraction leases, tax 
subsidies, and exemption from compensating for 
externalities.350  Both are making free market claims, with an 
implicit argument that only a market failure allows the 
existing, destructive economic practices to continue. 
The rhetorical parallels among defenders of the status quo 
are even starker:  both slavery and fossil fuels have been 
defended as nationally and globally necessary to support a 
minimum standard of living.  Consider this statement by 
Exxon Mobil CEO Rex Tillerson: 
 
We do not have a readily available replacement for the energy 
that provides the means of living that the world has today—our 
standard of living, but equally and perhaps more important, the 
2 billion people on the planet that live below anything that we 
would find acceptable . . . .  We do not see a viable pathway, any 
known technology today, to achieve the 350 outcome that is not 
devastating to economies, societies, and people’s health and 
welfare around the world.351 
 
 
349.  Supra note 345 and accompanying text. 
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This defense of fossil fuels echoes nineteenth century defense 
of slavery by Edmund Ruffin: 
 
The introduction and establishment of domestic slavery is 
necessarily an improvement of the condition and wealth and 
well-being of the community in general, and also of the comfort of 
the enslaved class . . . and is beneficial in every such case to the 
master class, and to the community in general.352 
 
There may also be some parallels between the epistemic 
closure of Southern intellectuals in the nineteenth century and 
the epistemic closure of modern-day U.S. conservatives and 
some Southern States on the issue of climate change.  Kenneth 
Stampp’s history of slavery in the American South, The 
Peculiar Institution, notes that in antebellum Southern States, 
there was a social more that precluded intellectual discussion 
critical of the institution of slavery, and these same States 
adopted laws banning the advocacy of abolition.353  This 
epistemic closure has been echoed in recent years on the issue 
of climate change, as rejection of climate science became an 
essential credential of conservative intellectual discussion,354 
and some States have adopted laws banning the teaching of 
climate science355 as well as the consideration of climate science 
in public policy making.356 
e. Social Movement Parallels 
Each generation seems to think that it invented the modern 
social movement, and social movement history starts with 
nineteenth century political economists such as Marx and 
Weber.357  Late twentieth century social movements are all 
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seen as following from the mid-twentieth century civil rights 
movement, ignoring precedents in the nineteenth century 
women’s suffrage movement and temperance movements, and 
in the abolition movement itself.  Indeed, British abolitionism 
may be the true antecedent for the modern social movement, 
for it was in late seventeenth century Britain that the domestic 
population found the economic and political space, combined 
with the nascent public media, to organize and advocate 
around an issue.  As historian Seymour Drescher notes in his 
history of abolition, abolitionist Granville Sharp’s organizing 
tactics found fertile soil in emerging British traditions of 
petition, voluntary associations, and press freedom: 
 
In forming this innovative plan, Sharp was tapping into an old 
repertoire of collective action within civil societies on both sides 
of the Atlantic.  British subjects regarded the right to petition as 
a fundamental right along with representative assemblies, strong 
local government, a plurality of religious communities, abundant 
voluntary associations, and newspapers.  Petitioning constituted 
a weapon in the public sphere that Anglo-American abolitionism 
would use intensively during the century to follow.358 
 
Thus, the abolitionists’ collective public advocacy tactics 
would seem familiar even to twenty-first century movement 
organizers. 
i. Mass Petition Drives and Gatherings 
Abolitionists mobilized existing social organizations such as 
churches to conduct petition drives, regularly delivering 
petitions signed by thousands of people in both Great Britain 
and the United States.  Interestingly, abolitionists are among 
the first social movements to mobilize women as a political 
force (despite their lack of suffrage), and it was a point of 
contention in Parliament whether Parliament need consider 
petitions signed by women given their lack of franchise.359  On 
this side of the Atlantic, petitions for Congressional action to 
abolish slavery were so numerous that Congress abandoned its 
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practice of considering every petition addressed to Congress 
individually.360 
Given the transportation and communications challenges of 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, mass gatherings 
of abolitionists were less common.  However, a Baltimore 
gathering of 4,000 African Americans in 1864 was the largest 
mass gathering of the time.361  Eighteenth century petition 
drives have their parallel in twentieth and twenty-first century 
marches on Washington, D.C., as Congress and the media have 
come to ignore constituent petitions and the media gives 
coverage to (at least some) mass gatherings. 
ii. Lawsuits 
Centuries before the school desegregation litigation efforts of 
the NAACP, eighteenth century British abolitionists turned to 
the courts to establish Britain as “free soil.”  Granville Sharp 
brought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of James Somerset, 
the slave of a Virginia planter who had been brought to Great 
Britain by his master, escaped, and was seized on British soil 
by his master.362  The case came before Lord Mansfield, 
England’s Chief Justice, who ruled that since the condition of 
slavery was odious and unknown at common law, it could exist 
in Britain only through positive law (act of Parliament), in the 
absence of which a putative master had no rights to his slave 
on domestic British soil.363  Somerset was freed, and Somerset’s 
case established Great Britain as “free soil” so that once a slave 
had set foot there he could not be re-enslaved by his master—at 
least as long as he remained on British soil.364  The disastrous 
Dred Scott decision in the United States was an attempt by 
abolitionists to establish for the Northern states the same “free 
soil” principle adopted the previous century in Great Britain.365  
And Somerset’s case may be the original paradigm for impact 
litigation seeking to obtain through judicial remedies social 
progress that was politically unavailable in the legislative 
 
360.  Id. at 302, 307–08. 
361.  CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS, FREEDOM’S PORT:  THE AFRICAN AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY OF BALTIMORE, 1790–1860, at 240–41 (1997). 
362.  Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.). 
363.  Id. 
364.  Id. 
365.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
304 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW Vol. 41:2 
branches, inspiring the school desegregation efforts of the civil 
rights movement, and the climate movement’s litigation 
initiatives seeking a judicially-ordered response to climate 
change under the public trust doctrine. 
iii. Lobbying and Legislative Efforts 
William Wilberforce’s abolitionist speeches to parliament are 
legendary, and have their modern analogues in the 
Washington, D.C. presence and lobbying efforts by U.S. 
environmental organizations seeking a legislative response to 
climate change.366 
iv. Direct Action and Civil Disobedience 
In the United States, abolitionists engaged in one of the most 
organized and extensive civil disobedience actions in history.  
Thousands of Northerners defied the Fugitive Slave Act by 
aiding escaped slaves to freedom in Canada on the 
Underground Railroad.367  John Brown’s disastrous assault on 
Harpers Ferry is an example of violent direct action that, 
although spectacular in its failure, helped to galvanize the 
abolitionist movement.368 
v. Values-Oriented Social Justice Issues Framing 
This may be the most significant parallel between 
abolitionism and climate activism.  The underlying issue 
framing is one of social justice and altruism—there are 
aggrieved parties (slaves for abolitionists, future generations 
for climate activists), but those aggrieved are completely 
excluded from the social and political system being organized 
into action.  Both movements appeal to the altruism of their 
adherents—concern for the well-being of others who are remote 
in time and place.  To be sure, abolitionists in both the U.K. 
and the United States gained some support from a nascent 
labor movement fearing competition from coerced labor.369  But 
most adherents acted out of altruistic concern for others 
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suffering injustice.370  This factor distinguishes the climate 
movement from both the civil rights movement (organized, at 
least initially, by the aggrieved group) and the temperance 
movement (though perhaps not directly aggrieved by alcohol 
consumption, but socially threatened by it). 
The success of abolitionists in organizing on behalf of a 
remote, politically powerless group of victims may be the most 
hopeful sign for the possible success of a climate activism 
movement. 
vi. Group Identification and Product Boycotts 
Sociologists note that markers of group identification are an 
important aspect of social movement success.  A social 
movement must create an “in-group” of shared characteristics, 
and if Professor Stoddard’s culture shifting marker for 
successful legal change is to be met, that “in-group” must 
become dominant in society.371  Like the teetotaling temperance 
advocates, abolitionists made significant lifestyle changes to 
internalize their commitment to their cause; significantly, 
many abolitionists refused to consume sugar, since most sugar 
was produced by slave labor.372  The climate activists’ 
movement has not, to date, achieved a unifying lifestyle 
marker for group identity.  350.org’s “fossil free” campaign is 
not a campaign to have members live free of fossil fuels, but 
simply to divest themselves (and their organizations) of 
ownership of fossil fuel industry stock.373  Since the vast 
majority of Americans don’t own stocks, this would be the 
equivalent of abolitionist society’s expecting no more lifestyle 
change than divestment from slave ownership, something no 
domestic abolitionist could have been doing anyway. 
In contrast to the current climate movement, for the most 
part, many eighteenth century American abolitionists would 
not eat sugar or purchase cotton products produced by slave 
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labor.374  They substituted honey and maple syrup for sugar, 
and linen and broadcloth for cotton fabrics.375  Regional 
abolitionist society meetings included resolutions requiring 
abstention from the produce of slavery, such as this February 
17, 1836 resolution of the Vermont Anti-Slavery Society:  
“Resolved, That by consuming the produce of the labor of 
slaves, we are directly sustaining the iniquitous system of 
slavery; and that therefore, as abolitionists, we are called upon 
to abstain from using such articles as are believed to come to us 
through a polluted channel.”376  The pages of radical 
abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison’s newspaper, The 
Liberator, are full of notices for stores carrying “free goods.”377 
No similar resolutions for abstention from fossil fuels have 
appeared in the climate movement literature as of yet.  It is as 
if the climate movement agrees with ExxonMobil that, “We do 
not have a readily available replacement for the energy that 
provides the means of living that the world has today.”378 
This is not to say that abolitionists were unanimous in their 
abstemiousness.  The pages of The Liberator also carry on a 
debate about whether it was hypocritical for an abolitionist to 
consume the products of slave labor.379  Those favoring 
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abstention argued that purchase of slave produce made the 
purchaser an accessory to the crime as surely as the receiver of 
stolen goods, and that the surest way to end slavery was to 
eliminate the market for its products.380  Others argued that 
there was no inherent vice in the goods themselves, that 
righteous abstention alienated the broader public, and that a 
boycott by abolitionists would not be significant enough to have 
any economic effect on the slave economy.381  One 
correspondent, writing in The Liberator, explicitly adopts the 
inconsequentialist argument against abstentionism: 
 
Is that course of conduct, probably adopted by a few only, and 
directly tending to deprive them of bread, and increase the 
distresses they already experience as a consequent of slavery; is 
that course, I say, the most proper—the most effectual toward 
the attainment of the end proposed—to wit—the abolition of 
slavery?  And if there be not reason to believe that its practical 
bearing will be as a means of abolition, I think we cannot be 
called upon to adopt it.382 
 
This nineteenth century argument against abstention based 
on the ineffectuality of individual action has been echoed in the 
climate change context in an essay in Environmental Ethics by 
Professor Joakim Sandberg entitled “My Emissions Make No 
Difference”:  Climate Change and the Argument from 
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Inconsequentialism.383  Sandberg argues that since each 
individual’s contribution to climate change is so vanishingly 
small, there is no individual ethical duty to reduce carbon 
emissions in the absence of organized collective action.384 
William Lloyd Garrison himself seems to have changed 
positions on the question, initially favoring abstention and then 
later accepting the impracticality of abstention and the need to 
carry on the battle for abolition on more favorable turf.  
Garrison wrote: 
 
At an early period of the anti-slavery enterprise, we were led, for 
a time, to regard the use of slave productions as personally 
involving a direct support of the slave system; but we were soon 
satisfied that we erred in judgment on this subject, that it was 
wasting time upon what no man could strictly reduce to practice, 
and that nothing would be gained by pressing it upon public 
attention.  There were a thousand strong and vital issues that 
could be made with the Slave Power, and we deemed it far more 
important to grapple with these, than to raise questions of 
conscience, which no casuistry could settle like a moral axiom.385 
 
William Lloyd Garrison’s 1847 apologia for non-abstention 
has also been echoed by 350.org’s Bill McKibben.  In a 2013 
essay in Orion Magazine, McKibben justifies his use of fossil 
fuels to travel around the country arguing for an end to the 
fossil fuel economy with a similar consequentialist argument 
that it is important to carry on his advocacy, that “what needs 
to change are not individuals but precisely that system” of 
fossil fuel powered economy.386  To be fair, McKibben powers 
his campaign bus with carbon neutral biofuels, but his rallies 
count on fossil fueled travel by supporters.387  Like Garrison, 
McKibben sees more fertile ground to engage with the fossil 
fuel industry than advocating for a boycott of its products.  He 
urges his followers to follow up modest decreases in their fossil 
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fuel use (as by driving a hybrid fossil fuel powered car) with 
dedicated advocacy to change the system.388 
Nineteenth century non-abstentious abolitionists defended 
their position on the grounds that the evil of slavery was in the 
production of cotton and sugar, not in the use of the goods 
themselves.  As a December 14, 1833 correspondent wrote:  “[i]t 
is confessed and agreed by all, that the use of sugar, cotton, 
tobacco and other products of slave labor, is not in itself, 
morally wrong; but it is said to become so, because it is the 
product of a system of wickedness.”389  According to that writer, 
drawing the analogy to temperance:  “[i]f the wheat raised by 
slave labor be contaminated, so is the wheat raised by the labor 
of the intemperate man, and to be consistent we must carry the 
effects of this doctrine as far in the one case as the other.”390  
This writer’s point that the slave produced sugar and cotton 
was not physically contaminated and worthy of sanction was 
adopted one hundred years later by one of the Supreme Court’s 
more ignominious decisions, Hammer v. Dagenhart, which 
struck down Congress’s attempt to ban commerce in goods 
produced by child labor.391  Similar reasoning was adopted by 
the World Trade Organization when, in the 1990s, it 
sanctioned the United States for enforcing laws banning the 
import of tuna caught using methods that asphyxiated 
dolphins—there was nothing inherently wrong with the goods 
themselves that would justify an import ban.392 
But there is an important difference between fossil fuels and 
slave-produced cotton, child labor produced furniture, or 
canned tuna produced with insufficient care for marine 
mammals.  In these other cases, the vice exists in the 
production of the goods, not their consumption.  When it comes 
to fossil fuels, the global climate evil is due largely to their 
consumption, not their production.  It is primarily the burning 
of fossil fuels that creates the greenhouse gases that warm the 
climate.  So even though some abolitionists might in good 
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conscious eat slave sugar and wear slave cotton while 
advocating for the end of slavery, climate advocates do not have 
the same excuse. 
A conclusion that abolition is the most apt analog for a 
successful legal antidote to climate change may be troubling.  
Mere legal, social, and political activism was not sufficient to 
prompt adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment and cultural 
internalization of the new anti-slavery norm.  Unlike Great 
Britain, abolitionism in the United States failed to achieve 
political success prior to the Civil War.393  It took a civil war 
with the greatest loss of life in American military history to 
accomplish the formal eradication of slavery.394  And while 
Northern abolitionist sentiment contributed to Southern 
secession and the start of the Civil War, it is impossible to say 
when (if ever) abolitionism might have achieved political 
success in the United States in the absence of the Civil War.  
Even after adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, it arguably 
took nearly another century for cultural internalization of the 
anti-slavery norm in the Southern states, as Jim Crow laws 
and peonage practices kept African Americans in Southern 
states in a status of economic and political servitude even 
though not enforced in the form of chattel slavery.395  Nor does 
regional conflict over painful climate response measures seem 
out of the question, as belief in climate science breaks down on 
regional and urban-rural divides and the impacts of reducing 
fossil fuel use may fall most heavily on rural populations who 
currently drive longer distances than their urban 
counterparts.396 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The accepted science and ineluctable mathematics of 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, combined with 
the glacial pace of the national and international legal response 
to this global environmental challenge, virtually ensure that 
the ultimate response to mitigate global warming will have to 
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be a ban on the use of greenhouse gas emitting fossil fuels.  
Such a ban is defensible based on the utilitarian, 
consequentialist ethics of avoiding grievous harm to other 
people.  Existing statutory authorities might well support 
imposition of such a ban, and congressional commerce and 
treaty powers also appear sufficient to support new legislation 
implementing such a ban.  Takings or fundamental rights 
challenges to such a ban seem likely to fail, at least under 
current law. 
A statutory, administrative, or even constitutional ban on the 
use of fossil fuels is thus possible.  Not all normative legal 
change is successful in its implementation, however.  Law 
change can mediate culture change only when the law reform 
efforts are paired with an effective social movement.  
Ultimately, climate change mitigation will require complete 
abandonment of fossil fuel consumption, a social and economic 
change of an order of magnitude equal to other law-mediated 
(or attempted) social changes such as civil rights, prohibition, 
and abolition. 
While the civil rights movement has been the model for most 
subsequent social change activism, at least in the United 
States, climate activism has an important structural difference 
from the civil rights movement—the civil rights movement was 
a grievance-prompted identity movement.  Climate activism, 
which lacks true climate change victims among its members, 
more resembles a values-oriented resource-mobilizing 
movement.  In this way, it may resemble the temperance 
movement more than the civil rights movement.  This is an 
unfortunate analogy, as the temperance movement is a 
spectacular example of a movement that enjoyed complete 
success politically and in changing the normative laws, but it 
was a spectacular failure in its implementation and failed to 
change the culture. 
Not all values-oriented legal-social reform movements are 
doomed to failure.  Abolitionism, which had its genesis in an 
active and open domestic political culture in eighteenth century 
Great Britain, is an example of a values-oriented, altruistic law 
and social reform movement that enjoyed ultimate and global 
success on the order that will be required for even a partial 
response to the coming climate catastrophe.  The climate 
movement has more maturing to do if it is to move beyond 
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mere resource-mobilization and become a true movement for 
social change.  For one thing, the movement may have to create 
a better definition of group membership through lifestyle 
choices—such as the emergence of leadership that has 
foresworn not just investment in fossil fuels, but also their 
consumption as well. 
